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Summary  
The consequences of VAT fraud are many and far-reaching. Tax fraud affects the state 
budget, which in turn has varying consequences, not least on welfare. Tax fraud distorts the 
competition for the benefit of dishonest traders, as they pay less VAT. Last but not least, tax 
fraud is also a matter of legitimacy, as it raises questions about how fair the tax system really 
is.  
Accordingly, Member States have both a right and an obligation to fight tax fraud. However, 
the same measures aimed at preventing tax fraud can compromise the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. For instance, if a Member State refuses to deduct input 
VAT for certain goods in order to combat tax fraud, it will result in companies established in 
other Member States having a competitive advantage, as they are allowed to deduct input 
VAT. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the objective of fiscal harmonisation, more 
specifically the objective of avoiding distortions of competition, pursued by the VAT 
Directive, is observed by the CJEU when interpreting the right of Member States to combat 
VAT fraud under Article 273 VAT Directive, having regard to the principles of neutrality and 
proportionality.  
In conclusion, in some aspects the Court has interpreted Article 273 VAT Directive in 
accordance with the objective of fiscal harmonisation, while in other aspects the interpretation 
has been contrary to this objective. All things considered, the interpretation of Article 273 
allows Member States to distort competition at national and Union level, either by introducing 
anti-fraud measures having this effect or by not doing enough to prevent VAT fraud. In a 
worst-case scenario, when making decisions on tax issues, such as choosing the place of 
establishment for VAT purposes, the decisions are not made on their economic merits by 
taxable persons but on tax evasion laws. This contradicts the notion of an internal market. 
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Abbreviations   
CJEU                                       Court of Justice of the European Union 
Council                                    Council of the European Union  
EU/Union                                European Union 
First (VAT) Directive             First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the  
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                                                on European Union, on the protection of the European     
                                                Communities' financial interests 
PFI Directive                           Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of   
the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the      
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                                                18 December 1995 on the protection of the European  
                                                Communities financial interests 
Second (VAT) Directive        Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the  
                                                harmonisation of legislation of Member States concerning  
                                                turnover taxes - Structure and procedures for application of the  
                                                common system of value added tax 
Sixth (VAT) Directive            Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the   
harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to 
turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform 
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TEU                                        Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union  
TFEU                                      Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the    
     European Union 
VAT       Value Added Tax  
VAT Directive                        Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the      
     common system of value added tax 
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 5 
1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The VAT GAP, the difference between expected VAT revenues and VAT actually collected, 
amounted to EUR 137.5 billion in 2017. The Member States collected 11.2 % less VAT than 
expected.1 According to a study, requested by the TAX3 Committee, this amount is the result 
of VAT fraud and inadequate collection systems, but mostly VAT fraud.2 VAT fraud is when 
a tax rule is deliberately broken in order to illegally obtain a tax advantage.3  
The consequences of VAT fraud are many and far-reaching. Tax fraud affects the state 
budget, which in turn has varying consequences, not least on welfare. Tax fraud distorts the 
competition for the benefit of dishonest traders, as they pay less VAT.4 Last but not least, tax 
fraud is also a matter of legitimacy, as it raises questions about how fair the tax system really 
is.5  
Accordingly, Member States have both a right and an obligation to fight tax fraud. However, 
the same measures aimed at preventing tax fraud can compromise the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. For instance, if a Member State refuses to deduct input 
VAT for certain goods in order to combat tax fraud, it will result in companies established in 
other Member States having a competitive advantage, as they are allowed to deduct input 
VAT. This is contrary to the notion of a functioning internal market. Disparities between the 
laws of the Member States, aimed at preventing VAT fraud, are liable to create or maintain 
distortions of competition. 
 
1 CASE and University of Barcelona, ‘Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2019 
Final Report’ (TAXUD/2015/CC/131, Institute for Advanced Studies 2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/vat-gap-full-report-2019_en.pdf> accessed 9 May 
2020 8.  
2 Marie Lamensch and Emanuele Ceci, ‘VAT fraud: Economic impact, challenges and policy issues’ (Policy 
Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies 2018) 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/156408/VAT%20Fraud%20Study%20publication.pdf> accessed 9 May 2020 
10.  
3 AD van Doesum, Herman van Kesteren and Gert-Jan van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT LAW (Kluwer 
Law International BV 2016) 40. 
4 However, in cases of carousel fraud, the tax evader(s) will even receive reimbursement for input VAT never 
paid downstream in the supply chain. For a definition of carousel fraud, see Nina Chestney, ‘FACTBOX – How 
carousel fraud works’ Reuters (London, 20 August 2009) <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-carousel-fraud-
britain-factbox-sb/factbox-how-carousel-fraud-works-idUKTRE57J43U20090820> accessed in 9 May 2020. 
5 For more information about the implications of tax fraud, see Valerie Braithwaite, ‘Tax evasion’ in Michael 
Tonry (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Crime and Public Policy (Oxford University Press 2011) 
<www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199844654.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199844654-e-
16> accessed 9 May 2020.  
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To ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, it is necessary that the Member States 
collect the right amount of VAT, no more no less. If a Member State, in the name of 
preventing tax fraud, collects more VAT than necessary then taxable persons in other Member 
States will have a competitive advantage as they pay less in VAT. On the contrary, if nothing 
is done to prevent tax fraud, taxable persons in other Member States will have a competitive 
disadvantage as they pay more in VAT. Distortions of competition will also occur within that 
Member State because not everyone commits fraudulent acts. To fight tax fraud without 
compromising the proper functioning of the internal market and its competitive terms is thus a 
challenge for Member States. 
Luckily, to cope with this challenge, national courts may ask the CJEU about the 
interpretation of EU law, including the VAT Directive6.7 For instance, according to Article 
273 VAT Directive, Member States may impose “obligations which they deem necessary to 
ensure the correct collection of VAT and prevent evasion”. Does this mean that the Member 
States may impose any measures they consider necessary to prevent tax fraud, as long as the 
requirements of Article 273 VAT Directive are met, regardless of the impact on the proper 
functioning of internal market? According to the wording, the answer is yes. However, 
according to settled case-law by the CJEU, the answer is no. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Court used several methods of interpretation, not only the linguistic method. They also 
applied two principles, namely neutrality and proportionality. This shows the role of the 
CJEU in preventing tax fraud.  
1.2 Purpose  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the objective of fiscal harmonisation, more 
specifically the objective of avoiding distortions of competition, pursued by the VAT 
Directive, is observed by the CJEU when interpreting the right of Member States to combat 
VAT fraud under Article 273 VAT Directive, having regard to the principles of neutrality and 
proportionality.  
 
6 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax OJ L347/1 
(VAT Directive). 
7 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C326/47 (TFEU), art 267.  
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1.3 Delimitations  
Since there are many legal questions related to the purpose of this thesis, some delimitations 
are necessary. Only Article 273 VAT Directive is analysed in relation to the objective of 
fiscal harmonisation. There are several articles in the VAT Directive but also elsewhere, both 
substantive and procedural, relating to the prevention of VAT fraud. For instance, pursuant to 
Article 394 VAT Directive, Member States may retain anti-fraud measures if these have been 
implemented by January 1, 1977 and reported to the European Commission before January 1, 
1978. According to 395 VAT Directive, in order to prevent tax evasion, Member States may 
derogate from the VAT Directive after submitting to a procedure laid down in this provision 
and obtaining unanimous approval from the Council. Furthermore, the EU has adopted two 
legislative acts of secondary law for the protection of the financial interests of the Union, the 
PFI Directive8 and the PFI Regulation9. The PFI Directive aims to protect the financial 
interests of the Union through criminal law, while the PFI Regulation intends to do the same, 
but through administrative measures. Protecting the financial interest of the Union includes 
preventing VAT fraud as there is a direct link between the tax revenue of the Member States 
and the financial interests of the Union. Member States must contribute with a percentage of 
the uniform basis of assessment for VAT to the Union.10 Moreover, as for procedural 
provisions, there are several provisions aimed at facilitating administrative cooperation 
between Member States to combat VAT fraud.11 These provisions regulate, inter alia, the 
exchange of information between Member States and joint audits.  
Additionally, the CJEU has independently developed legal grounds for preventing VAT 
fraud. According to well settled case-law, if a person carries out fraudulent acts himself or 
should have known that he is participating in tax fraud, he may be denied the right to exempt 
or deduct VAT.12 Lastly, according to prevailing opinion and settled case-law, Member States 
 
8 Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against 
fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law OJ L198/29 (PFI Directive).  
9 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European 
Communities financial interests OJ L312/1 (PFI Regulation).  
10 Council Decision of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European Communities’ own resources (2007/436/EC, 
Euratom) OJ L163/17 (Council Decision 2007/436/EC), art 2(1). 
11 Council Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 of 7 October 2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud 
in the field of value added tax OJ L268/1; Council Regulation (EU) 2017/2454 of 5 December 2017 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 904/2010 on administrative cooperation and combating fraud in the field of value added tax 
OJ L348/1.  
12 C-18/13 Maks Pen [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:69, paras 22-32; Joined Cases C-131, C-163 and C-164/13 
Schoenimport "Italmoda" Mariano Previti (C-131/13), Turbi.com (C-163/13) and Turbo.com Mobile Phone’s (c-
164/13) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2455, paras 41-62.  
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and the EU legislature must comply with the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the 
Treaties.13 Despite the low number of cases dealing with the fundamental freedoms in the area 
of VAT, the VAT Directive and national VAT legislation relating to the prevention of VAT 
fraud must be compatible with the fundamental freedoms. Therefore, it is necessary to 
underline that the ambition of this paper is only to analyse Article 273. Analysing other 
provisions related to the prevention of VAT fraud is an important but time-consuming 
endeavor, which is not possible to do within the framework of this thesis. The reader should 
know that there are other legal grounds for combating VAT fraud, other than Article 273 
VAT Directive, which are not analysed in this paper in relation to the objective of fiscal 
harmonisation. However, to the extent that other provisions affect the interpretation and 
application of Article 273 VAT Directive, they are also dealt with in this paper. 
In line with the purpose of this paper, the focus is on the principles of neutrality and 
proportionality. At the same time, there are many principles underlying the common VAT 
system and are applied by the CJEU. Examples of such principles, in addition to neutrality 
and proportionality, are the principles of conferral and subsidiarity, the general principles of 
equal treatment and non-discrimination, the principles of legal certainty and legal 
expectations.14 Analysing the interpretation of the CJEU, in the light of all these principles, is 
not possible within the framework of this thesis. Therefore, as regard the interpretation of 
VAT provisions, the reader should know that the application of other principles than 
neutrality or proportionality may result in an outcome which relate to the objective of fiscal 
harmonisation differently.  
1.4 Method   
In line with the purpose of this paper, Article 273 VAT Directive is analysed in relation to the 
objective of fiscal harmonisation. First, the wording of Article 273 is analysed. Then, after 
this is done, the interpretation of Article 273 by the CJEU is analysed. In other words, the 
paper makes a distinction between legislation and interpretation.  
This division between legislation and interpretation provides a greater understanding of the 
relationship between the Union legislator and the CJEU, and their responsibilities in the field 
of VAT. For instance, although the wording of a provision may be ambiguous and lead to 
 
13 Karoline Spies, ‘Fundamental freedoms and VAT: an analysis based on the Credit Lyonnais case’ (2017) 6(2) 
World Journal of VAT/GST Law 100, 107-108.  
14 Ben Terra and Julia Kajus, A guide to the European VAT Directives (IBFD 2019) ch 2.   
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undesirable consequences given the objective of fiscal harmonisation, this issue may be 
resolved or at least mitigated by the CJEU through their case-law. However, if there is a 
problem with the legislation, one may reflect on whether it should be resolved by the Court, 
or the Union legislator. The CJEU has long been accused of judicial activism for their 
interpretation and frequent use of fundamental principles.15  
Moreover, according to the traditional understanding of the law, the courts does nothing but 
applying the law.16 No matter who makes the judicial decision, legally, the result will be the 
same. The concepts of de lege lata and the lege ferenda is based on this understanding.17  
However, this view of the law is false, now more than ever. It does not reflect the open 
texture and indeterminacy of EU law. The CJEU has a margin of discretion, the exercise of 
which can take many forms, in interpreting and applying norms.18 To illustrate, since 
indetermination leave room for competitive interpretation of the law, the Court has the 
discretion to formulate the possible interpretations and also choose between them. Hence, to 
highlight the discretion of the CJEU, this paper makes a distinction between legislation and 
interpretation.  
Arguably, the analysis of Article 273 VAT Directive should be divided into legislation, 
interpretation but also application. The CJEU may not settle national cases, but national 
courts can.19 Functionally, following the principles of direct effect and supremacy, national 
courts can be seen as European Courts.20 National courts are responsible for applying EU 
VAT law. Applying the VAT provision on tax fraud correctly involves difficulties not only in 
interpreting VAT provisions, for which the CJEU is primarily responsible,21 but also actual 
circumstances. Different understandings of actual circumstances between national courts may 
 
15 Jane Reichel, ‘EU-rättslig metod’ in Maria Nääv and Mauro Zambino (eds), Juridisk metodlära (2nd edition, 
Studentlitteratur AB 2018) 126–127, 131.  
16 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart Publishing 1998) 16-17.  
17 Eva-Maria Svensson, ‘De lege interpretata – om behovet av metodologisk reflektion’ [2014] JP 211, 212–215. 
18 Miguel Poiares Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution (Hart Publishing 1998) 16-19. See also Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law 
Review 282, 282-283; Per-Anders Forstorp, ‘Det juridiska fältet: Critical Legal Studies, Foucault och Bourdieu’ 
(2003) 3 Tidskrift för litteraturvetenskap 16; Robert Påhlsson, Hunden klockan tre och fjorton (Iustus Förlag AB 
2005) ch 3; Robert Påhlsson, ‘Om värderingars roll i rättstillämpningen’ [2006] SvJT 258; Moa Bladini, 
‘Objektivitet i dömandet – på gott och ont?’ [2016] SvJT 303.   
19 TFEU, art 267.  
20 Robert Schütze, European Union law (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press 2018) 403-404. 
21 TFEU, art 267. 
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affect the proper functioning of the internal market.22 To highlight the discretion of national 
courts, for the same reasons mentioned above, it would be appropriate to divide the analysis 
into another level, namely application. It would also provide a greater understanding of the 
relationship between the Union legislator, the CJEU and the Member States in the field of 
VAT. However, to do this would require me to analyse the national law of at least some 
Member States, which is not possible within the framework of this paper. To understand, 
describe and analyse EU VAT law is an important but time-consuming endeavor.23 Also, the 
distinction between interpretation and application is far from obvious. According to Article 
267 TFEU, the CJEU only has jurisdiction over issues relating to the validity or interpretation 
of EU law, not the application thereof. It is settled case-law that the CJEU has no jurisdiction 
to apply EU law.24 Yet, as stated by Davies, “it is well-known that it often delivers judgement 
so specific that the case is effectively decided, in which it rules unambiguously on matters of 
fact”.25 Since the CJEU has a broad understanding of interpretation, it is difficult to 
distinguish between interpretation and application, which is another reason for not dividing 
the analysis into application as well.26 
To analyse the legislation (the VAT Directive), the concept of flexibility is used. This 
provided a good basis for analysing Article 273 VAT Directive, and its combability with the 
objective of fiscal harmonisation. According to Barnard, there is flexibility in the choice of 
legislative instruments and within legislative instruments.27 For instance, unlike regulations, 
directives allow for a degree of flexibility – and thus fragmentation of national laws – by their 
very nature.28 However, in this paper, the focus is on flexibility within legislative instruments, 
so called flexibility in implementation. Such flexibility can be of two types: micro- and meso-
 
22 Pernilla Rendahl, ‘EU VAT and Double Taxation: A Fine Line between Interpretation and Application’ (2013) 
41(8/9) Intertax 450, 456-458.  
23 See Eleonor Kristoffersson, ‘Comparative studies of national law in the EU harmonized VAT’ (2016) 1 
Nordic Tax Journal 29.  
24 Joined Cases C-28, C-29 and C-30/62 Da Costa en Schaake NV and Others v Administrate der Belastingen 
(C-28/62), Meijer (C-29/62) and Hoechst-Holland (C-30/62) [1963] ECLI:EU:C:1963:6, 31, 38; C-6/64 Costa v. 
E.N.E.L. [1964] ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, 592-593; C-13/68 Salgoil v Ministero del commcercio con l'estero [1968] 
ECLI:EU:C:1968:54, 454, 459; C-320/88 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v Shipping and Forwarding Enterprise 
Safe [1990] ECLI:EU:C:1990:61, para 11. 
25 Gareth Davies, ‘The Division of Powers between the European Court of Justice and National Courts’ (2004) 3 
Webpapers on Constitutionalism & Governance beyond the State 1, 7.  
26 For a better understanding of the relationship between the CJEU and national courts, as regards Article 267 
TFEU, see Gareth Davies, ‘The Division of Powers between the European Court of Justice and National Courts’ 
(2004) 3 Webpapers on Constitutionalism & Governance beyond the State; Takis Tridimas, ‘Constitutional 
review of member state action: The Virtues and vices of an incomplete jurisdiction’ (2011) 9(3/4) International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 737.  
27 Catherine Barnard, ‘Flexibility and Social Policy’ in Gráinne De Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Constitutional 
Change in the EU: From uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart Publishing 2000) 203–213.   
28 TFEU, art 288.  
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flexibility. 29 In cases of meso-flexibility, while the provisions are understood to be concrete 
and do not allow for general derogations, they explicitly exempt one or more Member States 
from their scope. On the other hand, in cases of micro-flexibility, the legislation provides for a 
broad degree of substantive discretion or allows for general derogations. For instance, in 
environmental law, provisions requiring the Member States to promote sustainable 
development are often characterised by micro-flexibility. Usually, in thinking about 
harmonisation, the focus is on meso-flexibility. The fewer State parties, the lower level of 
harmonisation. However, the level of micro-flexibility may also affect the degree of 
harmonisation, and in this paper the focus is mainly on this latter relationship.  
1.5 Material  
EU law prevails over national law.30 According to Article 4 TFEU, shared competence 
applies in the field of VAT.31 This competence has been used to harmonise the area of 
turnover taxes through the introduction of, inter alia, the VAT Directive. According to Article 
288 TFEU, the VAT Directive is only binding as to the result to be achieved. However, to 
guarantee the implementation of directives, the CJEU has, among other things, developed the 
doctrine of direct effect. If the VAT Directive is implemented incorrectly or not on time, 
individuals may invoke its provisions in national courts. This presupposes that the invoked 
provision is clear and precise, unconditional and absolute.32 Since Article 273 VAT Directive 
does not confer rights on individuals, it has no direct effect. However, when justifying their 
alleged violation of other provisions having direct effect, Member States invoke Article 273 
VAT Directive.33 Therefore, the VAT Directive is used as material.  
The provisions of the VAT Directive aimed at preventing VAT fraud are Articles 11, 19, 80, 
131, 158(2), 273, 343, 394 and 395 VAT Directive.34 Only these provisions specifically 
mention VAT fraud in various forms, such as “evasion” or “possible evasion”. These 
provisions can be divided into general and specific depending on whether they have a general 
 
29 Gráinne De Búrca, ‘Differentiation within the Core: The Case of the Common Market’ in Gráinne De Búrca 
and Joanne Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU: From uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart Publishing 2000) 
138-140.    
30 C-6/64 Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v 
Einfuhrund Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECLI:EU:C:1970:114. 
31 See also Rita de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (IBFD 2009) 19-22.   
32 C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; C-148/78 Ratti 
[1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:110; C-80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECLI:EU:C:1987:431.  
33 See, for instance, C-127/18 A-PACK CZ [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:377, para 26. 
34 Arguably, Article 80 VAT Directive is intended to prevent tax abuse and not VAT fraud. For the difference 
between fraud and abuse, see Chapter 2.  
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or specific connection to the so-called VAT determination scheme.35 For instance, in 
accordance with Article 11(1) VAT Directive, Member States may regard a group of related 
companies as a single taxable person. Since Article 11(1) VAT Directive is related to the 
concept of taxable person, it is specific. According to Article 80 VAT Directive, in order to 
prevent tax evasion or avoidance, Member States may adjust the taxable amount if the parties 
are closely related. Since this provision is related to the concept of taxable amount, it is 
specific. According to Article 273 VAT Directive, Member State may impose special 
measures which they deem necessary to prevent evasion. Since these measures can be related 
to any aspect of the VAT determination scheme, Article 273 is general. Only Articles 273, 
394 and 395 VAT Directive are general. Nevertheless, in line with the purpose of this paper, 
only Article 273 is analysed in relation to the objective of fiscal harmonisation.  
According to Article 411(2) VAT Directive, references to repealed (VAT) Directives shall be 
construed as references to this Directive in accordance with Annex XII. Repealed (VAT) 
Directives is also used as material.  
According to Article 267 TFEU, national courts may ask the CJEU about the interpretation of 
EU law, such as the VAT Directive. The purpose of the preliminary reference procedure is to 
guarantee uniformity in the decentralised application of EU law, but also to make it possible 
for the CJEU to fulfil its task, namely, to ensure that the interpretation and application of EU 
law is observed.36 According to the principle of sincere cooperation, which is set out in 
Article 4 TEU37, national courts must interpret EU law in accordance with the interpretation 
provided by the CJEU.38 Therefore, case-law from the Court is used as material. In line with 
the purpose of this paper, the selection of case-law is primarily based on whether they include 
an interpretation of Article 273 VAT Directive. Other cases of significance to the 
interpretation and application of Article 273 have also been used. All cases relating to Article 
273 VAT Directive have been analysed. 
1.6 Disposition   
The disposition is as follows. In Chapter 2, the concept of VAT fraud is examined. How does 
VAT fraud relate to the objective of preventing tax evasion, avoidance and abuse? What is the 
 
35 For a more detailed description of the VAT determination scheme, see AD van Doesum, Herman van Kesteren 
and Gert-Jan van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT LAW (Kluwer Law International BV 2016) 43-50.   
36 Ulf Bernitz, Europarättens genomslag (Norstedts Juridik 2012) 82–83.  
37 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union OJ C326/13 (TEU).  
38 Ben Terra and Julia Kajus, A guide to the European VAT Directives (IBFD 2019) 36-38.  
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difference between tax fraud and abuse? Next, in Chapter 3, the functions and fundamental 
characteristics of VAT are presented. What is the objective of fiscal harmonisation and 
essential characteristics of EU VAT? Since the CJEU has played an important role in the 
development of EU VAT law, their methods of interpretation, neutrality and proportionality 
are also presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the micro-flexibility of the VAT Directive is 
analysed in light of Article 273 VAT Directive. In Chapter 5, the interpretation of Article 273 
VAT Directive by the CJEU is analysed. Have the challenges identified in Chapter 4, which 
relates to the relationship between preventing VAT fraud and the objective of avoiding 
distortions of competition, been resolved or at least mitigated by the Court? Lastly, in Chapter 
6, the final remarks are presented. 
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2 Concept of VAT Fraud 
 
For the purpose of this essay, it is necessary to examine the concept of VAT fraud. The VAT 
Directive contains several provisions aimed at preventing evasion and avoidance. According 
to the Court, unlike the concept of tax avoidance, tax evasion involves an element of intent on 
the part of the taxpayer. However, for VAT purposes, there is no need to differentiate between 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. The purpose of eliminating distortions of competition requires 
the prevention of both tax evasion and tax avoidance. It is a matter of effect and not 
intention.39  
Accordingly, in several cases, the CJEU has held that preventing tax evasion, tax avoidance 
and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the VAT Directive.40 To achieve this 
objective, in addition to ensuring the correct collection of VAT, EU law cannot be relied on 
for fraudulent or abusive ends.41 The prevention of tax evasion relates to the concept of 
fraudulent acts,42 while the general principle of abuse of rights43 relates to the concept of 
abusive practices.44 Tax avoidance is related to the general obligation to ensure the correct 
collection of VAT.45 Therefore, as far as the Court is concerned, tax fraud is the same as tax 
evasion. 
VAT fraud may be regarded as an abuse of tax law; however, an abuse does not necessarily 
involve tax fraud. VAT fraud is when a tax rule is deliberately broken in order to illegally 
obtain a tax advantage.46 Examples of VAT fraud are under-reported sales, failure to register 
 
39 Joined Cases C-138 and 139/86 Direct Cosmetics Ltd (C-138/86) and Photographs Ltd (C-139/86) [1988] 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:383, paras 20-23.  
40 C-320/17 Marle Participations [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:537, para 41; C-712/17 EN.SA [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:374, para 31; C-273/18 Kuršu zeme [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:588, para 34.   
41 Joined Cases C-80 and C-142/11 Mahagében (C-80/11) and Dávid (C-142/11) [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:373, 
para 41; C-277/14 PPUH Stehcemp [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:719, para 47. 
42 The terms fraud and evasion are used as synonyms in the case-law of the CJEU. See, for instance, Joined 
Cases C-138 and 139/86 Direct Cosmetics Ltd (C-138/86) and Photographs Ltd (C-139/86) [1988] 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:383, para 22; C-574/15 Scialdone [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:295, para 26 and C-648/16 
Fontana [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:932, para 33. 
43 In the 2006 Halifax case (C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:121), the CJEU explicitly 
stated, for the first time, that the principle of prohibiting abusive practices also applies in the field of VAT (para 
70). However, in light of their previous case-law, this was no surprise. Previously, the Court has been clear that 
the prevention of abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the VAT Directive.  
44 Rita de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (IBFD 2009) 269-274; AD van Doesum, 
Herman van Kesteren and Gert-Jan van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT LAW (Kluwer Law International BV 
2016) 39-42.  
45 See Joined Cases C-138 and 139/86 Direct Cosmetics Ltd (C-138/86) and Photographs Ltd (C-139/86) [1988] 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:383, paras 20-23. 
46 AD van Doesum, Herman van Kesteren and Gert-Jan van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT LAW (Kluwer 
Law International BV 2016) 40.  
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for VAT, misclassification of commodities, VAT collected but not remitted and false claims 
for credit or refund of VAT.47 However, in cases of abuse, no tax rule has been broken but 
only applied to an artificially created situation, which does not reflect economic reality, in 
order to obtain a tax advantage. According to settled case-law, in order for abuse to exist, the 
following criteria must be met:  
first, the transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the 
conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive and the 
national legislation transposing it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the 
grant of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions. 
Second, it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the 
essential aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage. As the 
Advocate General observed in point 89 of his Opinion, the prohibition of abuse 
is not relevant where the economic activity carried out may have some 
explanation other than the mere attainment of tax advantages.48  
The distinction between VAT fraud and abuse is important because the consequences of 
considering a tax scheme as fraud or abuse differ. In cases of abuse, the transactions must be 
redefined,49 while in cases of VAT fraud the right of deduction or exemption from VAT is 
denied.50  
However, in cases where there is neither VAT fraud nor abuse, “taxpayers may choose to 
structure their business so as to limit their tax liability”.51 In other words, in choosing between 
two transactions, taxable persons are not required to choose the one which involves paying 
the highest amount of VAT. Tax planning should therefore be distinguished from VAT fraud 
and abuse.  
 
47 Michael Keen and Stephen Smith, ‘VAT Fraud and Evasion: What Do We Know, and What Can be Done?’ 
(2006) 59(4) National Tax Journal 861, 865-868.  
48 C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, paras 74-75; C-419/14 WebMindLicenses [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, para 36; C-273/18 Kuršu zeme [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:588, para 35.  
49 C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, para 94.  
50 C-624/15 Litdana [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:389, para 32.  
51 C-255/02 Halifax and Others [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, para 73; C-425/06 Part Service [2008] 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:108, para 47; C-103/09 Weald Leasing [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:804, para 27. See also C-
419/14 WebMindLicenses [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, para 42.  
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3 Functions and Fundamental Characteristics of EU VAT  
3.1 The Objective of Fiscal Harmonisation: Achieving an Internal 
Market 
For the purpose of this essay, it is necessary to clarify the objective of fiscal harmonisation. In 
clarifying the objective of fiscal harmonisation, I assume the perspective of the Union 
legislator.  
In accordance with the principle of conferred competence, if the EU adopts a legal act without 
or on the wrong legal basis, the act can be declared invalid by the CJEU on the ground of lack 
of competence.52 As regards the choice of legal basis, the CJEU has established two 
requirements. First, the choice must be based on objective factors that are available for 
judicial review, such as the aim and content of the legal act. Second, the legal basis used shall 
be required by the main or predominant purpose of the legal act.53 Therefore, to clarify the 
objective of fiscal harmonisation, the institutional grounds for harmonising turnover taxes is 
useful. The legal basis for harmonising turnover taxes is now Article 113 TFEU.54 According 
to Article 113: 
The Council shall […] adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation 
concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to 
the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and 
the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of competition.  
The phrase “to avoid distortion of competition” was introduced only after the harmonisation 
of VAT for reasons of clarity. The legislative powers conferred upon the Union is thus limited 
by the concept of an internal market55. Legislative acts, such as regulations or directives, must 
be intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market. They cannot only aim to regulate the internal market.56 What does ´the establishment 
 
52 TFEU, art 263.   
53 David Langlet and Said Mahmoudi, EU Environmental Law and Policy (Oxford University Press 2016) 123.   
54 C-144/13 VDP Dental Laboratory and Others [2015] ECLI:EU:2015:116, para 60.  
55 According to Article 26 TFEU, the internal market shall “comprise an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaties”. However, this definition is ambiguous and falls short in explaining the meaning of the internal market 
as a legal concept. The meaning of the internal market is subject to intense controversy. For more about the 
internal market as a legal concept, see Rita de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (IBFD 
2009) 6-11 and Stephen Weatherill, The Internal Market as a Legal Concept (Oxford University Press 2017) 1-
14.  
56 C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:544, para 83.  
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and functioning of the internal market´ mean? While the former concerns obstacles to free 
movement,57 the latter addresses distortions of competition resulting from disparities between 
national laws.58 The distortions must be appreciable.59 All in all, the Union legislator may 
only rely on Article 113 TFEU to eliminate obstacles to free movement or appreciable 
distortions of competition resulting from disparities between national laws.  
Accordingly, as regards the common VAT system, the predominant objective of fiscal 
harmonisation is to eliminate obstacles to free movement and distortions of competition, 
which is confirmed by the Preamble of the First (VAT) Directive60 and the CJEU.61  
However, the elimination of obstacles to free movement and distortions of competition is not 
the only reasons for harmonisation in 1967. Before the harmonisation of turnover taxes, only 
France had a VAT, while the other Member States had cascade systems. Preparatory works 
show that these cumulative, multi-stage turnover taxes had major disadvantages. For instance, 
when goods are exported, they must be relived of the tax burden. Failure to do so will reduce 
the competitiveness of European companies in international trade. With cumulative taxes, it is 
almost impossible to calculate the exact amount of the tax burden on a product, as this amount 
depends on the number of stages in the supply chain. Moreover, since the tax amount depends 
on the number of stages in the supply chain, cumulative turnover taxes encourage vertical 
integration of enterprises. VAT does not have these disadvantages.62 Taxing services is also 
easier with VAT, and that was considered a great advantage.63 For these reasons, in April 
 
57 In the 2000 Tobacco Advertising case (C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:544), the CJEU held that this ground could be used to facilitate but not prohibit trade. For 
instance, in view of the trend in national legislation towards greater restriction of tobacco products, the CJEU 
held that a prohibition on advertising such products in periodicals, magazines and newspapers is necessary to 
eliminate future obstacles to the free movement of press products. However, as regards advertising on other 
products, such as posters and parasols, a prohibition will “in no way help to facilitate trade” concerning these 
products (paras 96-101).  
58 Robert Schütze, European Union law (2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press 2018) 555. 
59 C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:544, paras 106-107.  
60 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States 
concerning turnover taxes OJ 71/1301 (First VAT Directive). 
61 C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:629, para 19; C-475/17 Viking Motors and 
Others [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:636, para 30.  
62 Rita de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (IBFD 2009) 48-50; AD van Doesum, Herman 
van Kesteren and Gert-Jan van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT LAW (Kluwer Law International BV 2016) 
10.  
63 Rita de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (IBFD 2009) 50.  
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1967, the Council established the common VAT system through the adoption of the First 
VAT Directive and Second VAT Directive64.  
Still, as the Member States were given a high level of discretion under the First and Second 
Directives, the national VAT legislation adopted by them differed substantially. Disparities 
between the VAT laws of the Member States were considered liable to create significant 
distortions of competition. Although it was clear that these must be eliminated, it was not 
until 1977 that the Council adopted a new directive, the Sixth (VAT) Directive65. The Second 
VAT Directive was repealed. The discretion left to the Member States was thus greatly 
reduced. 66 Arguably, the main reason for adopting this directive is not the elimination of 
distortions of competition, but something more practical. In 1970, the Council decided that 
every Member States must contribute to the Union with a percentage of the uniform basis of 
assessment for VAT. To ensure that each Member States carries a proportional burden, 
national VAT legislation must not differ substantially within the Union. This underlined the 
importance of further harmonising the VAT, which the Council did seven years later through 
the Sixth Directive.67 In 2006, the Council adopted the VAT Directive, thus replacing the 
First and Sixth Directive, for reasons of clarity and rationalisation. Compared to the Sixth 
Directive, the VAT Directive contains few material changes.68 As regards EU VAT, the main 
legislation is now the VAT Directive. 
All in all, the objective of fiscal harmonisation is to eliminate obstacles to free movement of 
goods and services, appreciable distortions of competition, cascading effects, difficulties in 
international trade and establish a common basis of assessment for VAT.69  
 
64 Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967 on the harmonisation of legislation of Member States 
concerning turnover taxes - Structure and procedures for application of the common system of value added tax 
OJ 71/1303 (Second VAT Directive).  
65 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States 
relating to turnover taxes - Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment OJ L145/1 (Sixth 
VAT Directive). 
66 Rita de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (IBFD 2009) 53-56.  
67 See C-539/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:733, para 75 and the cited case-law.  
68 AD van Doesum, Herman van Kesteren and Gert-Jan van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT LAW (Kluwer 
Law International BV 2016) 12-16.  
69 These objectives are not separate but interlinked. To illustrate, in the 1982 Hong Kong case (C-89/81 Hong-
Kong Trade [1982] ECLI:EU:C:1982:121), the CJEU held that the purpose of eliminating distortions of 
competition meant that similar goods should bear the same tax burden whatever the length of the production and 
distribution chain (para 6). This suggests that cascading turnover taxes are contrary to the objective of avoiding 
distortions of competition.    
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3.2 Essential Characteristics of EU VAT  
According to settled case-law by the CJEU, under Article 401 VAT Directive, the 
maintenance or introduction of taxes, duties, or charges are prohibited if they display the 
essential characteristics of VAT.70 The purpose of this provision is to prevent Member States 
from circumventing the harmonisation of VAT by introducing new turnover taxes. This raises 
the question of what the essential characteristics of VAT are. According to the Court, VAT 
has the following four characteristics:  
• It applies generally to transactions relating to goods and services. 
• It is proportional to the price charged by the taxable person for goods and services.  
• It is charged at each stage of the supply chain.  
• Taxable persons have the right to deduct the VAT paid upon acquired goods and 
services used for the taxed transactions of the taxable person.71 
This is confirmed by Article 1 VAT Directive. VAT is a general tax on consumption as 
opposed to a specific tax. VAT is proportional to the price charged by the taxable person. For 
instance, if the VAT rate is 25 %, the tax amount is 25 % of the price before the tax. VAT is 
an all-stage tax and thus charged at every stage of production and distribution chain. Taxable 
persons have the right to deduct the VAT paid upon acquired goods and services used for the 
taxed transactions of the taxable person. The right of deduction is a fundamental principle of 
the common system of VAT. The deduction system is intended to relieve the trader entirely of 
the tax burden.72  
Note that, in order to ensure the notion of VAT as a tax on consumption, it is important to 
maintain the essential characteristics of VAT. For instance, if the taxable amount is not the 
consideration actually received or if the right of deduction is refused, the VAT is effectively 
not a tax on consumption but on economic activity. This is contrary to the objective of fiscal 
harmonisation, which is to avoid the disadvantages of a cascading turnover tax. This is an 
 
70 C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co. [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, paras 19-23; C-101/00 Tulliasiamies and Siilin 
[2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:505, paras 105-106; C-308/01 GIL Insurance and Others [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:252, 
para 31; C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:629, para 27; C-475/17 Viking Motors 
and Others [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:636 , paras 26-27; C-185/18 Oro Efectivo [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:485, 
paras 20-21. 
71 C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co. [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:110, para 22: C-475/03 Banca popolare di Cremona 
[2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:629, para 28; C-475/17 Viking Motors and Others [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:636, para 
39; C-185/18 Oro Efectivo [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:485, para 23.  
72 C-329/18 Altic [2019] ECLI:EU:E:2019:831, paras 26-27 and the cited case-law.  
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important aspect as many Member States, in order to prevent VAT fraud, undermine the 
essential characteristics of VAT under Article 273 VAT Directive. To illustrate, in the 2019 
A-PACK case,73 in the interest of preventing VAT fraud, Czech Republic refused to reduce 
the taxable amount, in cases of total or partial non-payment, if the debtor is no longer a 
taxable person. Hence, the essential characteristics of VAT and the notion of VAT as a 
consumption tax are important aspects in the context of preventing VAT fraud.  
3.3 The CJEU in the Field of EU VAT  
The CJEU has played an important role in the development of EU VAT through their 
extensive case-law. The interpretative methods used by the CJEU, as well as the principles of 
neutrality and proportionality are presented below. The purpose of this is to contribute to a 
better understanding of the Court's reasoning in Chapter 5.  
3.3.1 Interpretative Methods  
The methods employed by the CJEU in their interpretation of EU legislation, including the 
VAT Directive, are described as literal, contextual and teleological. Despite common beliefs, 
there is no clear hierarchy between these methods. In fact, in many cases, these different 
methods are applied simultaneously or balanced against each other.74  
The literal method of interpretation aims to clarify the meaning of an article based on its 
wording. To illustrate, in the 2019 Oro Efectivo case, the CJEU held that an “interpretation of 
[Article 401] leads to the conclusion that, in view of the negative condition in the expression 
´cannot be characterised as turnover taxes´, the maintenance or introduction by a Member 
State of taxes, duties or charges is authorised only on condition that they cannot be 
assimilated to a turnover tax”.75 According to the contextual method, in interpreting an article, 
consideration should not only be given to its wording but also context.76 The provision, which 
is subject to interpretation, is regarded as part of a whole. For example, in several cases, the 
CJEU has stated that since VAT is a general tax on consumption, the exemptions from VAT 
should be interpreted strictly.77 The CJEU are primarily known for applying the teleological 
 
73 C-127/18 A-PACK CZ [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:377. 
74 Eleonor Kristoffersson and Pernilla Rendahl, Textbook on EU VAT (2nd edition, Iustus Förlag AB 2019) 28–
31.  
75 C-185/18 Oro Efectivo [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:485, para 21. 
76 See C-433/08 Yaesu Europe [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:750, para 24 and the cited case-law.  
77 C-449/17 A & G Fahrschol-Akademie [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:202, para 19 and the cited case-law.  
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method. Maduro, former Advocate General, refers to two different levels of teleological 
interpretation used by the Court.78 Usually, in thinking about the teleological method, the 
focus is on the what Maduro calls the teleological level of interpretation. According to this 
method, in interpreting an article, the focus is on its purpose. However, in the interpretation of 
an article, the Court also applies the metateleological level of interpretation by focusing on 
the telos of the legal context in which this provision forms part of. 
3.3.2 Neutrality  
The EU VAT system shall ensure the highest level of neutrality. Neutrality is derived from 
Article 113 TFEU and Article 1(2) VAT Directive. Despite being a fundamental principle of 
EU VAT law,79 neutrality is not a rule of primary law but a principle of interpretation. Thus, it 
cannot determine the validity of secondary law, such as the VAT Directive and its 
provisions.80 The principle of neutrality functions as an interpretative tool with a multi-
facetted face.81 Moreover, the essence of neutrality can manifest itself through other 
principles, for example the principle of uniform application82 and right of deduction.83 It is a 
principle with many corollaries.  
Neutrality is a relative principle. It refers to whether one certain VAT effect is neutral 
compared to another.84 However, in order to assess whether there is neutrality in a particular 
case, the Court often takes its point of departure in the objective of fiscal harmonisation and 
essential characteristics of VAT. According to Doesum, Kesteren and Norden, neutrality has 
an economic and legal aspect.85 The economic aspect of neutrality, referred to as system 
 
78 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional 
Pluralism’ (2007) 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies 1, 5.   
79 C-454/98 Schmeink & Cofreth and Strobel [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:469, para 59.  
80 C-334/14 De Fruytier [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:437, para 37; C-40/15 Aspiro [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:172, 
para 31; C-573/15 Oxycure Belgium [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:189, para 32. Arguably, this is only true to form. 
To illustrate, in determining the validity of secondary law, such as Council Decisions under Article 395 VAT 
Directive which allows a named Member State to derogate from the VAT Directive, the substance of neutrality 
can still determine the validity of secondary law. However, since the principle of neutrality cannot formally 
determine the validity of secondary law, the Court speaks in terms of, for example, the principle of the right of 
deduction (see, for instance, C-17/01 Sudholz [2004] ECLU:EU:C:2004:242). 
81 Eleonor Kristoffersson and Pernilla Rendahl, Textbook on EU VAT (2nd edition, Iustus Förlag AB 2019) 31. 
82 According to the principle of uniform application, in order to avoid Member States interpreting the concepts of 
EU law differently and thus circumventing the harmonisation of VAT, it is up to the Court to define the concepts 
laid down in the VAT Directive. For example, where this principle has been applied, see C-264/14 Hedqvist 
[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:718, para 33.  
83 Rita de la Feria, ´EU VAT principles as interpretative aids to EU VAT rules: the inherent paradox´ [2016] 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper No. 16/03 6, 7. 
84 Eleonor Kristoffersson and Pernilla Rendahl, Textbook on EU VAT (2nd edition, Iustus Förlag AB 2019) 31. 
85 AD van Doesum, Herman van Kesteren and Gert-Jan van Norden, Fundamentals of EU VAT LAW (Kluwer 
Law International BV 2016) 36–39.  
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neutrality, entails that the VAT should be proportional to the actual price charged by the 
taxable person for goods or services (VAT excluded). This means that VAT should not 
encourage vertical integration of enterprises, create cascading effects or result in double or 
non-taxation. The Court has, in several cases, used the essence of system neutrality to 
interpret EU VAT law.86 This aspect of neutrality is mainly related to the essential 
characteristics of VAT. The trader, as a tax collector on behalf of the State, must be relieved 
entirely from the burden of VAT. The legal aspect of neutrality, referred to as legal neutrality, 
is a reflection of the principle of equal treatment in the field of VAT.87 This principle 
precludes taxable persons who are in competition with each other from being treated 
differently for VAT purposes. Legal neutrality has also been used by the Court on numerous 
occasions.88 Legal neutrality is mainly related to the objective of avoiding distortions of 
competition.89  
As shown, the principle of neutrality is a vehicle for achieving the objective of fiscal 
harmonisation and maintaining the essential characteristics of VAT. The use of neutrality is a 
mixture of the contextual and teleological approach to EU VAT law by the CJEU.  
3.3.3 Proportionality   
Proportionality is derived from the laws of the Member States,90 and is a general principle of 
EU law.91 Since proportionality is not only a principle of interpretation but also primary law, 
it can determine the validity of secondary law, such as the VAT Directive.92 Like many other 
 
86 See, for instance, C-454/98 Schmeink & Cofreth and Strobel [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2000:469; C-29/08 SKF 
[2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:665, para 56. 
87 C-38/16 Compass Contract Services [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:454, paras 21-39; C-308/16 Kozuba Premium 
Selection [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:869, para 43. 
88 See, for instance, C-566/16 Vámos [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:321, para 48; C-145/18 Regards Photographiques 
[2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:668, para 36; C-715/18 Segler-Vereinigung Cuxhaven [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:1138, 
paras 35-37; C-211/18 Idealmed III [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2019:168, para 41. 
89 C-481/98 Commission v France [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:237, para 22.  
90 Graínne de Búrca, ‘Proportionality and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law’ in Ulf Bernitz and Joakim 
Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 95-96.  
91 Joined Cases C-177 and 181/99 Ampafrance and Sanofi [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:470, para 42 and the cited 
case-law.  
92 In Joined Cases C-177 and C-181/99 Ampafrance and Sanofi [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:470, the CJEU found 
that Council Decision 89/487/EEC – which allowed France to introduce a special measure derogating from now 
Article 176 VAT Directive – invalid for lack of proportionality. The French measure to combat tax evasion and 
avoidance was not proportionate. Moreover, in C-17/01 Sudholz [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:242, the CJEU 
examined the validity of Article 2 of Council Decision 2000/186/EC which allowed Germany to introduce a 
special measure derogating from now Article 27 and 68 VAT Directive. In assessing whether Article 2 – which 
restricts the right of deduction – infringes the substantive requirement of Article 395 VAT Directive, the CJEU 
found that Article 2 is not disproportionate in view of its purpose to combat tax evasion and simplify the 
procedure for collecting VAT.  
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general principles of EU law, the actual meaning and scope of proportionality is not codified, 
neither in TFEU nor TEU. Nowadays there is Article 5(4) TEU. However, according to 
settled case-law, the principle is much wider in both scope and meaning than implied by 
Article 5(4) TEU. 
Proportionality is a balancing principle used to determine whether an interest or right 
recognised by the legal order is excessively restricted. According to Advocate General 
Trstenjak, in the 2011 Commission v Germany case, proportionality requires that the measure 
be appropriate, necessary and reasonable in order to attain the objective pursued. A measure is 
appropriate to ensuring attainment of the objective pursued if it genuinely reflects a concern 
to attain it in a consistent and systematic manner. A measure is necessary if, from among 
several measures which are appropriate for meeting the objective pursued, it is the least 
onerous for the protected interest. An unreasonable restriction exists where, despite its 
contribution to attaining the legitimate objective pursued, the measure results in excessively 
strong interference in the protected interest.93 Usually, the application of proportionality 
consists in the Court taking the following steps: 
first, identifying what legally protected right or interest is at stake; secondly, 
identifying the extent to which this right or interest has been inferred with or 
restricted; thirdly, identifying the reason (the purported justification) for its 
restriction, whether for the protection of another right or public interest etc., and 
if so what weight is to be given to that other interest.94 
As regards this paper, the rights or interests at stake relates to the objectives and principles of 
the VAT Directive, while the purported justification is the prevention of VAT fraud. To what 
extent can the objectives and principles of the VAT Directive be restricted in the prevention 
of VAT fraud? The tension between the objectives and principles of the VAT Directive, on 
the one hand, and the objective of preventing tax VAT fraud, on the other hand, results from 
the fact that anti-fraud measures often affects people not involved in fraud. This lack of 
precision is necessary for the measures to be effective. The alternative, which is to investigate 
VAT fraud in each case, is neither administratively possible nor cost-efficient. 
 
93 C-539/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:733, Opinion of General Advocate, paras 91-92, 
126-127 and the cited case-law. 
94 Graínne de Búrca, ‘Proportionality and Subsidiarity as General Principles of Law’ in Ulf Bernitz and Joakim 
Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer Law International 2000) 97.  
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4 Analysis of Article 273 VAT Directive 
As shown in Chapter 3, the objective of fiscal harmonisation is preventing distortions of 
competition, eliminate obstacles to free movement of goods and services, avoid cascading 
effects, difficulties in international trade and establish a common basis of assessment for 
VAT. However, in line with the purpose of this paper, the focus is on the competitive terms of 
the internal market and thus the objective of avoiding distortions of competition. 
Disparities between the laws of the Member States are liable to create or maintain distortions 
of competition. Hence, in order to prevent distortions of competition, Member States have 
harmonised the area of turnover taxes, now through the VAT Directive. Usually, in thinking 
about harmonisation, the focus is on meso-flexibility. Since all Member States are bound by 
the VAT Directive, there is “full harmonisation” in terms of meso-flexibility. However, the 
degree of harmonisation is also affected by the level of micro-flexibility. In this chapter, the 
micro-flexibility of the VAT Directive is analysed in light of Article 273. According to 
Article 273: 
Member States may impose other obligations which they deem necessary to 
ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent evasion, subject to the 
requirement of equal treatment as between domestic transactions and 
transactions carried out between Member States by taxable persons and 
provided that such obligations do not, in trade between Member States, give rise 
to formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers.  
The option under the first paragraph may not be relied upon in order to impose 
additional invoicing obligations over and above those laid down in Chapter 3. 
Article 273 is a general derogation from the VAT Directive. Despite not explicitly authorizing 
derogations from the VAT Directive, such as Article 395 VAT Directive, measures 
introduced under Articles 273 are effectively derogations.95 Therefore, as a starting point, the 
VAT Directive is characterised by a high level of micro-flexibility. However, the introduction 
of special measures under Article 273 is subject to substantive restrictions. The level of 
 
95 See, for instance, C-188/09 Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jóźwiak, Orłowski [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:454; 
C-101/16 Paper Consult [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:775.  
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micro-flexibility – and thus the impact on the objective of fiscal harmonisation – must take 
these restrictions into account. 
Before taking these restrictions into account, note that Article 273 VAT Directive is optional 
and not mandatory. Member States may introduce anti-fraud measures. The optional nature of 
Article 273 may have a distortive effect on competition at national and Union level. As 
referred to above, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, Member 
States must collect the right amount of VAT, no more no less. If nothing is done to combat 
VAT fraud, taxable persons in other Member States will have a competitive disadvantage as 
they pay more in VAT. Distortions of competition will also occur within that Member State 
because not everyone commits fraudulent acts. Those who manage to commit VAT fraud pay 
less in VAT compared to their competitors.  
The first restriction is that Member States may only introduce measures under Article 273 to 
ensure the correct collection of VAT and prevent evasion. However, the meaning of evasion 
is not included in the VAT Directive. In the absence of legal guidance, Member States may 
adopt an extensive or, for them, favorable interpretation of evasion. If Member States 
interprets the concept of tax evasion differently or extensively, anti-fraud measures introduced 
by them may compromise the competitive terms of the internal market.  
Second, under Article 273 VAT Directive, Member States may impose measures “which they 
deem necessary” to ensure the correct collection of VAT or prevent evasion. According to the 
wording, the measure need not be necessary. Member States may introduce any measures they 
deem necessary. Having this margin of discretion enables Member States to act contrary to 
the objective of fiscal harmonisation when preventing VAT fraud.  
Thirdly, as regards Article 273 VAT Directive, anti-fraud measures are subject to “the 
requirement of equal treatment as between domestic transactions and transactions carried out 
between Member States”. Arguably, despite its wording, this requirement does not prevent 
Member States from discriminating between domestic and intra-Union transactions. Usually, 
in EU law, requirements of equal treatment are for the protection of intra-Union 
transactions.96 Hence, intra-Union traders can demand equal treatment but not domestic 
traders. Such an interpretation of equal treatment is clearly liable to distort competition to the 
disadvantage of domestic transactions. In preventing VAT fraud, the Member State may 
 
96 See, for instance, C-86/78 Peureux [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:64, para 32.   
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impose measures only on domestic traders which may, in one way or another, affect their 
ability to compete with other taxable persons. 
Nevertheless, there are restrictions in Article 273 VAT Directive compatible with the 
objective of fiscal harmonisation. Anti-fraud measures adopted under Article 273 may not 
include additional invoicing obligations over and above those laid down in Chapter 3 VAT 
Directive. Directive 2001/117/EC introduced this restriction in Article 22(8) of the Sixth VAT 
Directive, now Article 273 VAT Directive, as the invoicing obligations have now been 
harmonised.97 Invoices enable tax authorities to carry out checks and buyers to prove, if 
necessary, the right of deduction.98 This restriction means that Member States may not impose 
additional invoicing obligations, under Article 273 VAT Directive, to carry out controls and 
thereby prevent VAT fraud. Invoicing obligations are liable to compromise the right of 
deduction. The right of deduction is an essential characteristic of VAT. In order to avoid 
cascading effects, on the basis of Article 273, this restriction is important. Moreover, while 
this requirement does not relate to the objective of avoiding distortions of competition 
directly, if Member States were allowed to impose additional invoicing obligations, thus 
compromising the right of deduction, the competitive terms of the internal market could be 
jeopardised indirectly. In other words, not allowing Member States to derogate from Chapter 
3 reduces the legal possibilities of Member States to distort competition. Furthermore, anti-
fraud measures adopted under Article 273 VAT Directive may not, in trade between Member 
States, give rise to formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers. Hence, the prevention 
of VAT fraud may not result in tax borders or other psychical barriers. This relates to the 
objective of eliminating obstacles to free movement of goods and services. 
In conclusion, the optional nature of Article 273 VAT Directive allows Member States to 
refrain from combating VAT fraud, thereby passively compromising the competitive terms of 
the internal market. Moreover, despite the legal restrictions in Article 273, the VAT Directive 
is characterised by a high level of micro-flexibility. The meaning of evasion is not included in 
the VAT Directive. The requirements of necessity and equal treatment are open to various 
interpretations contrary to the objective of fiscal harmonisation. This level of micro-flexibility 
implies acceptance of derogations that are contrary to the competitive terms of the internal 
market, and thus the objective of fiscal harmonisation.  
 
97 Ben Terra and Julia Kajus, A guide to the European VAT Directives (IBFD 2019) 1461. 
98 Ben Terra and Julia Kajus, A guide to the European VAT Directives (IBFD 2019) 1417. 
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5 Analysis of the interpretation of Article 273 by the CJEU  
Due to Article 273, the VAT Directive is characterised by a high level of micro-flexibility. As 
shown in Chapter 4, this level of micro-flexibility implies acceptance for derogations that 
interfere with the competitive terms of the internal market. However, as indicated above, the 
process of harmonisation is an ongoing process and not solely in the hands of the Union 
legislator but also the CJEU.99 The CJEU can harmonise the interpretation and application of 
VAT provisions through their case-law. This chapter investigates whether the CJEU has 
resolved or mitigated the challenges to the objective of fiscal harmonisation presented in 
Chapter 4.  
The disposition is as follows. Initially, it is analysed whether - and in what way - the CJEU 
has dealt with the risk of distortive effects of the optional nature of Article 273 on 
competition. Next, the interpretation of tax evasion by the CJEU is analysed. Finally, the 
margin of discretion left to Member States under Article 273, as interpreted by the CJEU, is 
analysed in relation to the objective of fiscal harmonisation, taking into account the 
requirement of equal treatment.  
5.1 Optional Nature of Article 273 VAT Directive  
The CJEU has not changed the nature of Article 273 VAT Directive from optional to 
mandatory. It is still up to the Member States if they wish to introduce anti-fraud measures 
under this provision. No Member State has been accused of failing to introduce measures 
under Article 273, neither by the European Commission nor any other Member State.  
However, Member States may have an indirect obligation to introduce anti-fraud measures 
under Articles 273 VAT Directive. According to settled case-law, Articles 2, 250(1) and 273 
of the VAT Directive, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, imposes an obligation on 
every Member State to take all legislative and administrative measures for ensuring collection 
of all the VAT due on their territory and for combating evasion.100 Thus, if they are not to 
disregard this obligation, Member States must in some cases impose anti-fraud measures 
 
99 See Chapter 1.4.  
100 C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:280, para 25; C-144/14 Cabinet Medical Veterinar Dr. 
Tomoiagă Andrei [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:452, para 25; C-105/14 Taricco and Others [2015] 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, para 36; C-576/15 Mary Marinova [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:740, para 41; C-648/16 
Fontana [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:932, para 33. 
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under Articles 273 VAT Directive. The 2016 Mary Marinova case may serve as an example 
of this.101 
Mary Marinova (MM), a Bulgarian national, sells food and non-food products by retail. In 
taking investigative actions against the commercial partners of MM, the Bulgarian tax 
authorities found that several of them had supplied products and issued invoices to MM. 
These products could not be found in the business of MM. Finding that MM had accounted 
neither for the incoming products from the suppliers nor the subsequent sales of these 
products, the Bulgarian tax authorities concluded that she had concealed the supplies and the 
revenue. They issued a tax adjustment notice. In determining the taxable amount, the 
Bulgarian tax authority assumed that the products were sold with a profit margin normally 
used by MM. The referring court asked the CJEU whether the Member States may presume 
that MM has subsequently sold the incoming goods to third parties and determine the taxable 
amount according to the factual information at hand in accordance with rules not included in 
the VAT Directive.  
The CJEU concluded that Articles 2(1)(a), 9(1), 14(1), 73 and 273 of the VAT Directive, 
having regard to the principles of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, do not preclude such 
national measures. After expressing the obligation of Member States to take all legislative and 
administrative measures to combat tax evasion, the CJEU held that VAT fraud, such as 
concealing supplies and revenue, must not hinder the collection of VAT. The Court further 
stated that, in light of Article 273 VAT Directive and the obligation of Member States to 
combat VAT fraud, the national competent authorities must re-establish the situation that 
would have prevailed in the absence of tax evasion. This suggests that the obligations 
imposed by the VAT Directive, in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, may require the 
Member States to introduce measures under Article 273 VAT Directive to re-establish the 
situation that would have prevailed in the absence of VAT fraud. Lack of rules in the VAT 
Directive, which can be applied to the case of MM directly, does not justify a Member State 
neglecting its obligation to fight VAT fraud. This shows how Member States may have an 
indirect obligation to introduce anti-fraud measures under Article 273 VAT Directive.102 
 
101 C-576/15 Mary Marinova [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:740.  
102 For an illustration of the relationship between the obligation of Member States to combat VAT fraud imposed 
by the VAT Directive, read in conjunction with Article 4 (3) FEU, and Article 273 VAT Directive, see C-566/16 
Vámos [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:321, paras 36-38.  
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Member States also have an obligation to prevent VAT fraud under provisions other than the 
VAT Directive. Article 325(1) TFEU requires the Member States to counter fraud and any 
other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the EU through effective deterrent 
measures. That provision has been interpreted as applicable also to VAT fraud.103 The reason 
is the direct link between the VAT revenue of the Member State and the financial interests of 
the Union. Member States must contribute with a percentage of the uniform basis of 
assessment for VAT to the Union.104  
The concept of fraud, for the purpose of Article 325 TFEU, is nonetheless not included in 
neither primary nor secondary EU law. In view of the purpose of giving solid protection to the 
financial interests of the Union, it is probably a concept of Union law. The definition of fraud 
does not necessarily correspond to the concept of tax evasion included in the VAT Directive. 
Useful guidance can be obtained from the definition of fraud contained in the PFI Directive or 
its predecessor, the PFI convention105, to which the Court referred in the 2015 Taricco and 
Others case.106 The definition of fraud, for the purpose of Article 325 TFEU, is nevertheless 
not necessarily limited to that of secondary law. The concept of tax evasion in the VAT 
Directive, if it does not correspond to the concept of fraud in Article 325 TFEU, it may still 
fall within the concept of other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the EU. 
This concept is without doubt broader than fraud.107  
My point is that the national legislature may be required to combat VAT fraud under 
provisions other than the VAT Directive,108 and thus indirectly be obliged to impose measures 
under Article 273 VAT Directive. According to settled case-law, the national legislature has 
the primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with Article 325 TFEU, for instance by 
amending national law.109 The case-law on Article 325 TFEU has largely focused on criminal 
 
103 C-539/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:733, para 72; C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson 
[2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:280, para 26; C-105/14 Taricco and Others [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, para 38;  
C-546/14 Degano Transporti [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:206, para 22; C-493/15 Identi [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:219, para 19. 
104 Council Decision 2007/436/EC, art 2(1).   
105 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of the 
European Communities' financial interests OJ C316/49 (PFI Convention). 
106 C-105/14 Taricco and Others [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, para 41. To illustrate, according to Article 1(b) 
PFI Convention, in respect of revenue, fraud may be any intentional act or omission relating to the use or 
presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete information, non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific 
obligation and misapplication of a legally obtained benefit that adversely affects the Union's resources.  
107 C-574/15 Scialdone [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:295, Opinion of General Advocate, paras 66-67.  
108 See also the PFI Directive and the PFI Regulation.  
109 C-42/17 M.A.S. and M.B. [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:936, para 41; C-612/15 Kolev and Others [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:392, para 65.  
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and administrative penalties for fraud, including VAT fraud. Has the Member State, in the 
context of its procedural autonomy, taken effective, proportionate and dissuasive measures 
against VAT fraud as required by Article 325 TFEU?110  
However, despite the obligation to combat VAT fraud in order to protect the financial 
interests of the Union, anti-fraud measures must be compatible with the principles underlying 
the common VAT system. There are several cases where criminal and administrative 
measures, adopted by a Member State, whose purpose is to combat VAT fraud have been 
assessed in light of fundamental principles of EU VAT, such as the principles of neutrality 
and proportionality, within the framework of the VAT Directive.111 
5.2 Definition of Tax Evasion 
There is no definition of tax evasion in the VAT Directive. This lack of definition may cause 
Member States to interpret tax evasion differently, thereby introducing derogations contrary 
to the objective of fiscal harmonisation. Luckily, in the 1988 Direct Cosmetics case, the CJEU 
dealt with the concepts of tax evasion and avoidance.112  
Two British companies sold products to a price below market value to non-taxable persons 
who, in turn, sold them to end consumers. No VAT was paid on the difference between the 
final value of the sale to consumers and the price previously charged. To deal with that form 
of tax avoidance, the United Kingdom introduced a measure derogating from Article 11 of the 
Sixth Directive (now Article 73 VAT Directive), under Article 27 of the Sixth Directive (now 
Article 395 VAT Directive), stating that the taxable amount should be the market value and 
not the consideration actually received. In appealing a direction on them, according to which 
the taxable amount is the market value, the two companies held that the British measure was 
outside the limits of the aims referred to in now Article 395 VAT Directive. By the first 
question, the London VAT Tribunal wished to know whether Article 395 VAT Directive 
permits the adoption of a derogating measure, such as that at issue, where the taxpayer carries 
on business in a certain matter not with any intention of obtaining a tax advantage but for 
commercial reasons. 
 
110 See, for instance, C-42/17 M.A.S. and M.B. [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:936, para 29; C-574/15 Scialdone 
[2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:295, para 24; C-310/16 Dzivev and Others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:30, para 23. 
111 See, for instance, C-259/12 Rodopi-M 91 [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:414 and C-712/17 EN.SA. [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:374.  
112 Joined Cases C-138 and 139/86 Direct Cosmetics Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (138/86) and 
Laughtons Photographs (C-139/86) [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:383. 
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The Court held that tax avoidance is a concept of Union law, the definition of which is not 
determined by the Member States. Moreover, regarding the difference between tax avoidance 
and evasion, the Court held that, while tax avoidance represents a pure objective 
phenomenon, tax evasion involves an element of intent on the part of the taxpayer. This 
distinction is confirmed by the historical background to Article 395 VAT Directive. Unlike 
the Second VAT Directive, which only refers to fraud, the Sixth VAT Directive mentions in 
addition the concept of tax avoidance. This means that the Union legislator sought to 
introduce a new element in relation to the pre-existing concept of tax evasion. This new 
element is the lack of intent on the part of the taxpayer. Furthermore, as regards the rationale 
behind preventing tax evasion and avoidance, the CJEU added the following: 
That interpretation is in conformity with the principle governing the system of 
value-added tax according to which the factors which may lead to distortions of 
competition at national and Community level are to be eliminated and a tax 
which is a neutral as possible and covers all the stages of production and 
distribution is to be imposed. The title of the Sixth Directive refers to a 'uniform 
basis of assessment' of value-added tax. Furthermore, the second recital in the 
preamble to the directive refers to 'a basis of assessment determined in a 
uniform manner according to Community rules' and the ninth recital specifies 
that 'the taxable base must be harmonized so that the application of the 
Community rate … leads to comparable results in all the Member States'. It 
follows that the system of value-added tax is concerned principally with 
objective effects, whatever the intentions of the taxable person may be.113 
Accordingly, in answering the first question, the Court held that Article 395 permits the 
adoption of a measure derogating from now Article 73 even where the taxable person acts 
commercially with no intention of obtaining a tax advantage. In other words, according to the 
Court, the intention on the part of the taxpayer has no bearing on the application of Article 
395 VAT Directive. Recently, this has been confirmed by the CJEU in the 2017 Avon 
Cosmetics case.114  
 
113 Joined Cases C-138 and 139/86 Direct Cosmetics Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (138/86) and 
Laughtons Photographs (C-139/86) [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:383, para 23. 
114 C-305/16 Avon Cosmetics [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:970, para 46.  
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Although the case was about Article 395 VAT Directive, their interpretation of tax evasion 
may be assumed to apply in relation to Article 273 VAT Directive as well. Nothing indicates 
otherwise. In fact, in answering the first question, the Court interpreted the concept of tax 
evasion in the area of VAT without specifically mentioning Article 395.115 In accordance with 
the principle of uniform application,116 the CJEU held that tax avoidance is a concept of 
Union law. Based on the Court's approach to the distinction between tax evasion and 
avoidance, expressed in Paragraphs 20 to 22 of the Judgment, it can be concluded that tax 
evasion is also a concept of Union law. The CJEU defines tax avoidance in relation to 
evasion. Furthermore, the objectives underlying the Court's teleological approach, which is to 
avoid distortions of competition and establish a common basis of assessment, supports the 
notion that tax evasion is a concept of Union law. Allowing Member States to define tax 
evasion on their own would compromise these objectives. The risk that Member States 
interpret the concept of tax evasion differently – thereby compromising the objective of fiscal 
harmonisation – has thus been resolved by the CJEU. 
Additionally, the CJEU interprets the concepts of tax evasion and avoidance in light of the 
objective of fiscal harmonisation, if not also the essential characteristics of VAT, which are 
referred to as the “principle governing the system of value-added-tax” in the 1988 Direct 
Cosmetics case.117 Whether there is intent has no bearing on whether the competition is 
distorted. Intent has also no impact on the objective of establishing a common basis of 
assessment. It is a matter of effect and not intent. The purpose of combating VAT fraud is 
generally to avoid loss of tax revenue. Nevertheless, in dealing with the concepts of tax 
evasion and avoidance, the CJEU does not at all mention the loss of tax revenue. Moreover, 
on numerous occasions, in cases concerning Article 273 VAT Directive, the CJEU has held 
that EU law does not prevent Member States from considering fiscal conduct that prevents the 
correct collection of VAT and thus compromises the proper functioning of the internal market 
as tax evasion.118 The definition of tax evasion is based on the objective of fiscal 
harmonisation. Therefore, from an EU perspective, the rationale behind fighting VAT fraud is 
not primarily to avoid loss of tax revenue. Based on the Court's reasoning, the rationale 
 
115 Joined Cases C-138 and 139/86 Direct Cosmetics Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (138/86) and 
Laughtons Photographs (C-139/86) [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:383, paras 22-23.  
116 See n 82.  
117 Joined Cases C-138 and 139/86 Direct Cosmetics Ltd v Commissioners of Customs and Excise (138/86) and 
Laughtons Photographs (C-139/86) [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:383, para 23.  
118 C-332/15 Astone [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:614, para 56; C-576/15 Mary Marinova [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:740, para 39; C-159/17 Dobre [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:161, para 41. 
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behind combating VAT fraud is to achieve the objective of fiscal harmonisation. VAT fraud 
compromises the competitive terms of the internal market. It also prevents the establishment 
of a common basis of assessment. Hence, VAT fraud must be prevented.  
This relates to the obligation of Member States to collect the right amount of VAT. Intent on 
the part of the taxpayer is irrelevant. If the Member State collects less VAT than prescribed, 
for example by not preventing VAT fraud, taxable persons in other Member States will have a 
competitive disadvantage as they pay more in VAT. Distortions of competition will also occur 
within that Member State because not everyone commits fraudulent acts. On the other hand, if 
the Member State collects more VAT than prescribed, taxable persons in other Member States 
will have a competitive advantage as they pay less in VAT. In both cases, there will be 
distortive effects on the competitive terms of the internal market, which is contrary to the 
objective of fiscal harmonisation. It is all about collecting the right amount of VAT. Hence, 
VAT fraud must be prevented.  
5.3 Margin of Discretion  
According to Article 273 VAT Directive, to ensure the correct collection of VAT and prevent 
evasion, Member States may impose obligations which they deem necessary. This has been 
interpreted by the Court as the Member States having a margin of discretion regarding the 
means of achieving the correct collection of VAT and preventing fraud.119 Disparities 
between the laws of the Member States, aimed at preventing VAT fraud, are nonetheless 
liable to create or maintain distortions of competition. If each Member State has its own 
measures to combat VAT fraud, it may lead to differences in compliance costs between 
companies in the different Member States, which in turn affect their ability to compete in the 
internal market. Admittedly, in exercising this margin of discretion, it is settled case-law by 
the CJEU that Member States must observe EU law and its principles, such as the principles 
of neutrality and proportionality,120 but that does not in itself prevent Member States from 
introducing different anti-fraud measures. For instance, in the 2006 FTI case, the CJEU held 
that, while imposing joint and several liability to pay VAT cannot be based on Article 273, 
Member States may require taxable persons who are joint and several liable under Article 205 
 
119 C-534/16 BB construct [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:820, para 21; C-566/16 Vámos [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:321, para 38; C-648/16 Fontana [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:932, para 35.  
120 C-566/16 Vámos [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:321, para 41. 
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VAT Directive to provide security for the payment of VAT.121 Not all Member States have 
introduced such a measure.  
That being said, in what way does the interpretation of Article 273, read in the light of the 
principles of neutrality and proportionality, relate to the competitive terms of the internal 
market?  
5.3.1 Neutrality  
The principle of neutrality, which functions as an interpretative tool with a multi-facetted 
face, is used by the CJEU to solve many legal issues relating to VAT.122 When it comes to 
combating VAT fraud, the principle of neutrality operates in two different situations in the 
context of Article 273. The distinguishing factor is the uncertainty about the existence of 
VAT fraud. If the measure introduced refers to a situation where it is established that the 
taxable person has committed VAT fraud, in determining whether the measure is precluded 
by the neutrality of VAT, the concept of legal neutrality is decisive. If the measure introduced 
concerns a situation where there is uncertainty about the existence of VAT fraud, in 
determining whether the measure is precluded by the principle of neutrality, a balance is made 
between the concept of system neutrality and the interest of preventing fraud. The legality of 
such a measure is determined by the principle of proportionality. Is it proportionate to limit 
the neutrality of VAT in the interest of preventing VAT fraud? However, in this section, I 
examine the use of neutrality in cases where the taxable person has been involved in VAT 
fraud.123  
As regards legal neutrality, it is a reflection of the principle of equal treatment in the field of 
VAT. This principle precludes taxable persons who are in a comparable situation and thus in 
competition with each other from being treated differently for VAT purposes.124 Accordingly, 
in the 1998 Goodwin case, the Court held that the principle of neutrality precludes "a 
generalized differentiation between lawful and unlawful transactions, except where, because 
of the special characteristics of certain products, all competition between a lawful economic 
sector and an unlawful sector”.125 Does this mean that the principle of neutrality precludes 
 
121 C-384/04 Federation of Technological Industries and Others [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:309.  
122 See Chapter 3.3.2.   
123 In the next section, I examine the use of neutrality in cases where the existence of VAT fraud is uncertain, 
given that compatibility with neutrality presupposes that the measure is also proportionate. 
124 C-566/16 Vámos [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:321, para 48. 
125 C-3/97 Goodwin and Unstead [1998] ECLU:EU:C:1998:263, para 9.  
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Member States from treating tax evaders differently for VAT purposes? In the 2016 Mary 
Marinova case, the CJEU held that the principle of neutrality cannot be relied upon 
successfully by a taxable person who has committed VAT fraud, such as concealing supplies 
and revenue. In other words, according to the Court, fraudsters are not in a situation 
comparable to that of taxpayers who comply with their tax obligations. Since they are not in a 
similar situation, they can be treated differently for VAT purposes. Therefore, the national 
measure imposed by Bulgaria under Article 273 to re-establish the situation that would have 
prevailed in the absence of VAT fraud does not undermine the neutrality of VAT.126 Thus, 
neutrality does not prevent Member States from restoring the competitive terms of the internal 
market by collecting the right amount of VAT from tax evaders.  
Moreover, in cases where the taxable person is involved in VAT fraud, the Court applies the 
concept of legal neutrality to the exclusion of system neutrality.127 The case-law on Article 
273 VAT Directive deals almost exclusively with Member States restricting the right of 
deduction to combat VAT fraud.128 Many Member States are introducing formal requirements 
aimed at ensuring the correct collection of VAT and combating VAT fraud, which taxable 
persons must comply with to fully exercise the right of deduction. For instance, in the 2010 
Profaktor case, Poland required taxable persons to retain accounting records by using cash 
registers. Otherwise, the deductible amount is reduced by 30 %.129 In the 2017 Paper Consult 
case, Romania denied the right of deduction for goods and services acquired by suppliers that 
have been declared inactive by the tax authorities. Taxpayers whose improper fiscal conduct 
prevents the detection of irregularities in the collection of VAT is declared inactive by the tax 
authorities. The declaration of inactivity is public and accessible on the internet to any taxable 
person.130 Note that they refer to situations where there is uncertainty about the existence of 
VAT fraud. Not using cash registers or buying from suppliers that have been declared inactive 
does not necessarily involve VAT fraud.131 These are examples of formal requirements, the 
purpose of which is to fight VAT fraud, for exercising the right of deduction.  
 
126 C-576/15 Mary Marinova [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:740, para 49.  
127 See Chapter 3.3.2.  
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129 C-188/09 Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jóźwiak, Orłowski [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:454. 
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131 C-101/16 Paper Consult [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:775, para 56.  
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At the same time, in accordance with the concept of system neutrality, the VAT should be 
proportional to the actual price of goods and services. This means that the collection of VAT 
must not result in cascading effects. When cascading, VAT is not based solely on the actual 
price of goods or services, but also on VAT from previous stages. Accordingly, in several 
cases, the CJEU has held that the right of deduction is an integral part of the common system 
of VAT and may, in principle, not be limited.132 National measures aimed at combating VAT 
fraud introduced under Article 273 may not have the effect of systematically undermining the 
right of deduction and thus the neutrality of VAT.133 The principle of neutrality requires 
deduction of VAT to be allowed if the substantive requirements found in Article 168(a) VAT 
Directive134 are satisfied, even if the taxable person has failed to comply with some formal 
requirements135. Does this mean that the principle of neutrality precludes Member States from 
restricting the right of deduction to prevent VAT fraud? 
On numerous occasions, the CJEU has held that the principle of neutrality cannot be invoked 
by taxable persons who have been involved in VAT fraud. Taxpayers who have committed 
VAT fraud are not in a situation comparable to that of taxpayers who have complied with 
their tax obligations. For instance, in the 2016 Astone case, the Court found that fiscal 
conduct that prevent the correct collection of VAT and thus compromise the proper 
functioning of the internal market may be regarded as tax evasion by Member States and in 
such cases, deductions for input VAT may be denied. In this case, the taxable person had 
failed to file a VAT return, keep accounting records and register the invoices issued and 
paid.136 Article 273 of the VAT Directive, having regard to the principle of neutrality, does 
therefore not prevent Member States from refusing the right of deduction for taxable persons 
involved in VAT fraud. The concept of legal neutrality is applied to the exclusion of system 
 
132 C-332/15 Astone [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:614, para 44; C-518/14 Senatex [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:691, 
para 37.  
133 C-332/15 Astone [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:614, para 49; C-101/16 Paper Consult [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:775, para 50.   
134 As regards the substantive requirements, the person wishing to exercise the right of deduction must be a 
taxable person, the goods or services relied on for the right of deduction must be used by the taxable person for 
the purpose of his taxed transactions and those goods or services must have been supplied by another taxable 
person as inputs (C-518/14 Senatex [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:691, para 28). 
135 As regards the formal requirements for exercising the right of deduction, pursuant to Article 178(a) VAT 
Directive, the taxable person must hold an invoice drawn up in accordance with Articles 220 to 236 and 238 to 
240 VAT Directive (C-518/14 Senatex [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:691, para 29). 
136 C-332/15 Astone [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:614, paras 56 and 58. See also C-159/17 Dobre [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:161, paras 40-41.   
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neutrality by the CJEU when assessing whether a measure is precluded by the principle of 
neutrality in cases where the taxable person is involved in VAT fraud.  
Taxable persons who have previously failed to fulfill their tax obligations may be treated 
differently by Member States to prevent VAT fraud without violating the principle of 
neutrality. In the 2017 BB construct case, to ensure the correct collection of VAT and prevent 
VAT fraud, Slovakia had allowed the tax directorate to require a taxable person, who presents 
a risk of unpaid taxes owing to its links with another legal person who has tax debts, to 
provide a guarantee for a period of 12 months.137 The Court held that taxpayers who have not 
complied with their tax obligations, in particular their obligations to register for VAT, are not 
in a comparable situation with taxpayers who comply with their obligation to register. 
Therefore, according to CJEU, the principle of neutrality does not preclude a tax authority 
from requiring a taxable person to provide a guarantee, which can amount to EUR 500,000, at 
the time of registration for VAT purposes, if the director of which was formerly the director 
of another legal person which had not complied with its tax obligations.138 This suggests that 
taxable persons who have a history of committing VAT fraud may be treated differently by 
Member States to prevent VAT fraud.  
All in all, it is clear that the principle of neutrality cannot be relied upon by persons who have 
been involved in VAT fraud. Since VAT fraud distorts the competition not only at national 
but also Union level, this use of neutrality is in line with the competitive terms of the internal 
market. This applies provided that the taxable person has actually committed or been involved 
in VAT fraud. There are several cases where the question has been whether the taxable 
person, in light of the circumstances of that particular case, has committed or is involved in 
VAT fraud.139 It is not uncommon for Member States to accuse taxable persons of being 
involved in VAT fraud and denying them exemptions or deductions. If a person carries out 
fraudulent acts himself or should have known that he is participating in VAT fraud, he may be 
denied the right to exempt or deduct VAT.140 However, to ensure the neutrality of VAT, the 
Court has been clear that objective evidence is required that the taxable person has been 
 
137 C-534/16 BB construct [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:820, para 22. 
138 C-534/16 BB construct [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:820, para 29.  
139 See, for instance, Joined Cases C-80 and C-142/11 Mahagében (C-80/11) and Dávid (C-142/11) [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:373; C-324/11 Tóth [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:549.  
140 Joined Cases C-131, C-163 and C-164/13 Schoenimport "Italmoda" Mariano Previti (C-131/13), Turbi.com 
(C-163/13) and Turbo.com Mobile Phone’s (c-164/13) [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2455 and C-18/13 Maks Pen 
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:69, paras 22-32.  
 38 
involved in VAT fraud, either knowingly or negligently.141 If the Member State is unable to 
prove the existence of VAT fraud in an individual case, i.e. if there is uncertainty about the 
existence of VAT fraud, taxable persons competing with each other may not be treated 
differently for VAT purposes according to the concept of legal neutrality.142 The CJEU has 
maintained neutrality whenever possible and insomuch it is possible.  
In cases where there is uncertainty about the existence of VAT fraud, in order for the measure 
not to be precluded by the concept of system neutrality, when this concept becomes relevant 
in an individual case, the imposed measure must also be proportionate. In other words, for the 
measure to be consistent with the concept of system neutrality, when this concept becomes 
relevant in an individual case, it must respect the principle of proportionality. To illustrate, in 
the 2018 Fontana case,143 in the interest of preventing VAT fraud and avoidance, Italy had 
introduced a measure under which the amount of VAT payable by a taxable person is 
determined by extrapolation based on sector studies approved by ministerial decree and, 
accordingly, to make a tax adjustment imposing the payment of an additional sum of VAT. 
Since the existence of VAT fraud is uncertain in these cases, the Italian measure, in order to 
be compatible with the principle of neutrality, must also be proportionate. That the amount of 
VAT payable by a taxable person is lower than it should be according to sectoral studies need 
not involve VAT fraud. Maybe the taxable person just had a bad year financially. When is an 
anti-fraud measure consistent with the principle of proportionality?   
5.3.2 Proportionality  
Normally, when applying the principle of proportionality in the context of Article 273, the 
CJEU begins by describing the objectives and principles of the VAT Directive at stake. What 
legally protected right or interest is compromised by the anti-fraud measure introduced by the 
Member State?  
The case-law on Article 273 VAT Directive deals almost exclusively with Member States 
restricting the right of deduction,144 the right to exempt intra-Community supplies from 
 
141 C-8/17 Biosafe - Indústria de Reciclagens [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:249, para 39 and the cited case-law.  
142 However, as shown in Chapter 5.3.3, the principle of neutrality does prevent Member States from treating 
domestic traders in a less favorable way than intra-Union traders in the name pf preventing VAT fraud, although 
no one has been proven to have committed VAT fraud.  
143 C-648/16 Fontana [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:932.  
144 See, for instance, C-188/09  Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jóźwiak, Orłowski [2010] 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:454; C-284/11 EMS-Bulgaria-Transport [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:458; C-332/15 Astone 
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:614; C-101/16 Paper Consult [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:775; C-159/17 Dobre [2018] 
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VAT,145 or refusing to reduce the taxable amount due to post-supply events, such as non-
payment by the purchaser,146 to prevent VAT fraud. Therefore, in most cases, the neutrality of 
VAT is at stake.  
According to the principle of system neutrality, the VAT should be proportional to the actual 
price of goods and services (VAT excluded). This means that taxable persons should have the 
right of deduction. Otherwise, the collection of VAT will result in cascading effects. When 
cascading, VAT is not based solely on the actual price of goods or services, but also on VAT 
from previous stages. Hence, on numerous occasions, the CJEU has held that the right of 
deduction is an integral part of the common system of VAT and may, in principle, not be 
limited.147 National measures aimed at combating VAT fraud introduced under Article 273 
may not have the effect of systematically undermining the right of deduction and thus the 
neutrality of VAT.148  
It also follows from the principle of system neutrality that the taxable amount must 
correspond to the consideration actually received for the supplied goods or services, in 
accordance with Article 73 VAT Directive. Otherwise, the VAT would not be proportional to 
the actual price of the relevant products. Accordingly, in order to not undermine the neutrality 
of VAT, the Court has held that national measures under Article 273 VAT Directive may, in 
principle, not derogate from the provisions in the VAT Directive relating to the taxable 
amount.149 For instance, in cases of non-payment by the purchaser, the supplier should have 
the right to reduce the taxable amount.150  
Moreover, to avoid double taxation contrary to the principle of system neutrality, the Member 
States are to exempt intra-Community supplies of goods from VAT.151 These transactions are 
taxed in the Member State of arrival.152 Double taxation creates cascading effects. In such a 
 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:161; C-533/16 Volkswagen [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:204; C-664/16 Vădan [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:933; C-712/17 EN.SA. [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:35. 
145 See, for instance, C-587/10 VSTR [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:592; C-146/05 Collé [2007] 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:549; C-563/12 BDV Hungary Trading [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:854;  
146 See, for instance, C-337/13 Almos Agrárkülkereskedelmi [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:328; C-404/16 Lombard 
Ingatlan Lízing [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:759; C-127/18 A-PACK CZ [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:337;  
147 C-332/15 Astone [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:614, para 44; C-518/14 Senatex [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:691, 
para 37; C-329/18 Altic [2019] ECLI:EU:E:2019:831, paras 26-27 and the cited case-law. 
148 C-332/15 Astone [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:614, para 49; C-101/16 Paper Consult [2017] 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:775, para 50;   
149 C-337/13 Almos Agrárkülkereskedelmi [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:328, para 38; C-127/18 A-PACK CZ [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:337, para 26. 
150 See VAT Directive, art 90; C-588/10 Kraft Foods Polska [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:40, para 26. 
151 VAT Directive, art 138(1).  
152 VAT Directive, art 2(1)(b).  
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case, VAT is not based solely on the actual price of the relevant goods in the country of 
arrival, but also on VAT from previous stages, which is contrary to the principle of system 
neutrality. Therefore, in order to ensure the neutrality of VAT, Member States should not 
restrict the right to exempt intra-Community supplies of goods from VAT.153  
What all these legal presumptions, which follow from the principle of neutrality, have in 
common is that they intend to relieve the trader, as a tax collector on behalf of the state, 
entirely from the burden of VAT. In other words, when applying the concept of system 
neutrality, the CJEU seeks to uphold the notion of VAT as a tax on consumption. The notion 
of VAT as a consumption tax is thus the interest at stake.  
However, in some cases, the legal interest being risked is not the neutrality of VAT. Not all 
national measures contradict the legal presumptions set by the principle of neutrality relating 
to, in particular, the right of deduction and the taxable amount. For instance, in the 2013 
Ablessio case,154 the referring court asked the CJEU whether the tax authority of a Member 
States may, in the interest of ensuring the correct collection of VAT and preventing evasion, 
refuse to assign a VAT identification number solely on the ground that, in the opinion of that 
authority, the company does not have the resources required to carry out the economic 
activity declared and that the shareholder of that company previously, on numerous occasions, 
has sold his shares shortly after obtaining an individual number without conducting economic 
activity. The essential aim of identifying taxable person is to ensure the proper operation of 
the VAT system. The interest being risked in this case is thus not neutrality but the proper 
operation of the VAT system. 
After describing the objectives and principles of the VAT Directive at stake, the Court usually 
states, in one way or another, that preventing VAT fraud is a legitimate interest. Preventing 
VAT is an objective recognised and encouraged by the VAT Directive.155 According to 
settled case-law, Articles 2, 250(1) and 273 of the VAT Directive, read in conjunction with 
Article 4(3) TEU, imposes an obligation on every Member State to take all legislative and 
administrative measures for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on their territory and for 
preventing VAT fraud.156 However, despite being a legitimate interest, in collecting the right 
 
153 See C-146/05 Collé [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:549, para 23.  
154 C-527/11 Ablessio [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:168.  
155 C-320/17 Marle Participations [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:537, para 41; C-712/17 EN.SA [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:374, para 31; C-273/18 Kuršu zeme [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:588, para 34.  
156 C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:280, para 25; C-144/14 Cabinet Medical Veterinar Dr. 
Tomoiagă Andrei [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:452, para 25; C-105/14 Taricco and Others [2015] 
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amount of VAT and preventing fraud, the measures introduced under Article 273 VAT must 
have as little effect as possible on the objectives and principles of the VAT Directive.157 They 
must not go further than is necessary to attain such objectives and must not undermine the 
neutrality of VAT.158  
In any case, in order for the measure to be necessary and thus compatible with the principle of 
proportionality, there must be a particular risk of tax evasion or avoidance. For instance, in 
the 2019 A-PACK case,159 Czech Republic had introduced a measure aimed at preventing 
VAT fraud which provides that taxable persons cannot reduce the taxable amount, in cases of 
total or partial non-payment, if the debtor is no longer a taxable person. The Court found that, 
in these circumstances, the reduction of the taxable amount does not constitute a particular 
risk of tax evasion or avoidance. Thus, according to the Court, the measure is not necessary 
and consistent with the principle of proportionality. That the debtor is no longer a taxable 
person, for example because that person is subject to insolvency proceedings as in this case, is 
not an appropriate indication of the occurrence of VAT fraud, which is why I agree with the 
Court. In the 2018 Pienkowski case,160 in the interest of preventing tax evasion and 
avoidance, to exempt supply of goods under Articles 146(1)(b) and 147 VAT Directive, 
Poland required that a taxable person must have attained a minimum level of turnover in the 
previous year, or have concluded an agreement with a person authorised to refund VAT to 
travelers. A failure to comply with these conditions results in the definitive loss for the 
taxable person of the export exemption even if the requirements of Articles 146(1)(b) and 147 
VAT Directive are met. According to the Court, the Polish measure is not necessary as there 
is no risk of tax evasion or avoidance. If the requirements of Articles 146(1)(b) and 147 VAT 
Directive are met, the transaction will not be taxed in Poland, so there is no risk of loss of tax 
revenue for Poland and thus fraud or avoidance. Accordingly, this requirement is precluded 
by Articles 131, 146(1)(b), 147 and 273 VAT Directive. 
In several cases, the Court has held that Member States must employ means which, while 
enabling them to effectively achieve the objectives pursued by their domestic law, are the 
 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, para 36; C-576/15 Mary Marinova [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:740, para 41; C-648/16 
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157 C-672/17 Tratave [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:989, para 33; C-127/18 A-PACK CZ [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:377, para 26.  
158 C-183/14 Salomie and Oltean [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:454, para 62; C-576/15 Mary Marinova [2016] 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:740, para 44;  
159 C-127/18 A-PACK CZ [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:377.  
160 C-307/16 Pieńkowski [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:124. 
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least onerous for the objectives and principles of EU law.161 This suggests that anti-fraud 
measures, in order to be necessary and thus proportionate, must be as flexible as possible. For 
instance, in the 2017 Paper Consult case, Romania denied the right of deduction for goods 
and services acquired by suppliers that have been declared inactive by the tax authorities. 
Taxpayers whose improper fiscal conduct prevents the detection of irregularities in the 
collection of VAT is declared inactive by the tax authorities. According to the CJEU, since it 
is impossible for the purchaser of goods and services to demonstrate that the transactions 
concluded with the trader declared inactive meets the conditions in the VAT Directive for 
exercising the right of deduction, this measure goes beyond what is necessary to prevent VAT 
fraud and collect the right amount of VAT.162 However, if flexibility compromises the 
legitimate objectives pursued by domestic law, inflexibility may still be consistent with the 
principle of proportionality. For instance, in the 2010 Profaktor case, in the interest of 
ensuring the correct collection of VAT and prevent fraud, Poland required taxable persons to 
retain accounting records by using cash registers. Otherwise, the deductible amount is reduced 
by 30 %. The Court considered this measure to be necessary and proportionate despite it 
being general and applied without exception.163 If Poland allows taxable persons to exercise 
the right of deduction in full by making it possible to demonstrate that the transactions 
concluded meet the requirements of Article 168 VAT Directive, the objective pursued by that 
measure, which is to increase the use of cash registers and thereby prevent VAT fraud, would 
be lost.  
By interpreting Article 273 in the light of the principles of neutrality and proportionality, the 
CJEU seeks to prevent Member States from collecting more VAT than necessary in the name 
of preventing VAT fraud. Article 273, having regard to the principles of neutrality and 
proportionality, precludes national measures which are largely fiscal in nature, such as the 
measure by the Czech Republic in the 2019 A-PACK case. National measures aimed at 
preventing VAT fraud must be genuine. Member States may only restrict the neutrality of 
VAT if necessary, to combat VAT fraud or avoidance. The neutrality of VAT cannot be 
limited, for instance, by refusing to reduce the taxable amount in cases of non-payment, only 
to increase tax revenue. 
 
161 C-307/16 Pieńkowski [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:124, para 34 and the cited case-law.  
162 C-101/16 Paper Consult [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:775, paras 33 and 60. See also C-648/16 Fontana [2018] 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:932, paras 42-45.  
163 C-188/09 Profaktor Kulesza, Frankowski, Jóźwiak, Orłowski [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:454, paras 27–29.  
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As referred to above, from an EU perspective, the rationale behind fighting VAT fraud is not 
primarily to avoid loss of tax revenue. Based on the Court's reasoning, the rationale behind 
combating VAT fraud is to achieve the objective of fiscal harmonisation. VAT fraud 
compromises the competitive terms of the internal market. Hence, VAT fraud must be 
prevented. On the other hand, from a national perspective, the rationale behind preventing 
VAT fraud is also to increase tax revenue. Therefore, to prevent Member States from 
collecting more VAT than necessary, such as by restricting the right of deduction, the 
principles of neutrality and proportionality play important roles. If a Member State, in the 
name of preventing tax fraud, collects more VAT than necessary then taxable persons in other 
Member States will have a competitive advantage as they pay less in VAT. To ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market, it is necessary that the Member States collect the 
right amount of VAT, no more no less. 
5.3.3 Equal Treatment  
According to Article 273 VAT Directive, to ensure the correct collection of VAT or prevent 
evasion, Member States may impose obligations which they deem necessary. However, these 
measures are subject to the requirement of equal treatment as between domestic transactions 
and transactions carried out between Member States by taxable persons. How does this 
requirement, read in the light of the principles of neutrality and proportionality, relate to the 
competitive terms of the internal market?  
At first glance, this requirement seems to be in line with the competitive terms of the internal 
market. Taxable persons who are in a comparable situation and thus in competition with each 
other should be treated equally. Where they conduct their economic activity should not 
matter. Still, in the 1996 Eismann case,164 the CJEU held that the requirement of equal 
treatment only applies to transactions between Member States in requiring that they be treated 
in the same way as domestic transactions.  
According to Italian law, all goods undergoing transport must, during transport, be 
accompanied by an accompanying document to facilitate fiscal controls. Following the 
abolition of fiscal controls between Member States on January 1, 1993, the Italian Ministry of 
Finance stated that this obligation from now on only applies in respect of internal trade and 
trade with third countries. Eismann sells foodstuffs from door to door and, in doing so, 
 
164 C-217/94 Eismann Alto Adige v Ufficio IVA di Bolzano [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:394. 
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employs salesmen who go with a lorry loaded with goods intended for sale to the homes of 
potential private consumers. After an inspection, Eismann was fined by the Bolzano VAT 
Office for transporting goods without the necessary documents. Eismann brought an action 
against the decision, arguing that the obligation under Italian law is incompatible with Article 
22(8) of the Sixth VAT Directive, now Article 273 VAT Directive. The referring court asked 
the CJEU whether such an obligation under Italian law is compatible with Article 273 VAT 
Directive where there is no such requirement in respect of intra-Union trade.  
The Court held that, in interpreting EU law, it is necessary to consider the context of the 
provision and not only its wording. Article 22(8) forms part of Title XVIa of the Sixth 
Directive whose provisions are essentially intended to regulate intra-Union trade and not trade 
which takes place within a single Member State. Moreover, the first three recitals of Directive 
91/680 show that the main purpose of this directive, which introduced the requirement of 
equal treatment in Article 22(8), is to complete the internal market, eliminate fiscal frontiers 
between Member States and abolish fiscal controls at internal frontiers for all intra-Union 
trade. The purpose is not to harmonise or simplify formalities relating to purely internal 
transactions. Therefore, Article 22(8) of the Sixth VAT Directive, now Article 273 VAT 
Directive, does not prevent Member States from introducing formalities for domestic 
transactions that are stricter than those applicable to intra-Union trade.165 This interpretation 
of equal treatment seems to have been confirmed by the CJEU in later cases.166  
This means that Member States may impose anti-fraud measures on domestic traders that are 
stricter than those applicable to intra-Union trade. Member States may even introduce 
measures only in respect of internal trade. Since these obligations create higher compliance 
costs for domestic transactions, competition will be distorted to the detriment of domestic 
traders. Hence, this interpretation of equal treatment is not compatible with the aim of 
ensuring the competitive terms of the internal market. When interpreting the requirement of 
equal treatment, the CJEU ignored one of the main purposes behind the harmonisation of 
VAT, which is avoiding distortions of competition. The CJEU should have considered that 
the requirement of equal treatment is indeed part of Title XVIa of the Sixth Directive, but also 
 
165 C-217/94 Eismann Alto Adige v Ufficio IVA di Bolzano [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:394, paras 2-4, 8-11 and 
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166 For instance, in the 2012 Kraft Foods Polska case (C-588/10 Kraft Foods Polska [2012] 
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the common system of VAT, whose purpose is also to avoid distortions of competition and 
thus achieve fair competition. In other words, in interpreting Article 22(8) of the Sixth VAT 
Directive, to avoid distortions of competition, the Court should have applied the 
metateleological level of interpretation.167  
It follows from the principle of neutrality that taxable persons who are in competition with 
each other may not be treated differently for VAT purposes.168 Still, when assessing whether a 
measure that distinguish between internal and intra-Union trade is precluded by the neutrality 
of VAT, the CJEU neglect this aspect of neutrality.169 Instead, in such cases, the Court applies 
only the concept of system neutrality to the exclusion of legal neutrality. In other words, the 
principle of neutrality does not prevent Member States from treating domestic traders in a less 
favorable way than intra-Union traders in the name of preventing VAT fraud, although no one 
has been proven involved in VAT fraud. This is clearly contrary to the competitive terms of 
the internal market, and thus the objective of fiscal harmonisation.  
Compared with measures aimed at persons involved in VAT fraud, however, anti-fraud 
measures that treat domestic transactions less favorably still have to respect the concept of 
system neutrality.170 In addition, all measures introduced under Article 273 VAT Directive 
must be proportionate.171 As referred to above, by interpreting Article 273 in the light of the 
principles of system neutrality and proportionality, the CJEU seeks to uphold the notion of 
VAT as a consumption tax and prevent Member States from collecting more VAT than 
necessary in the name of preventing VAT fraud.172 This, on the other hand, is compatible with 
the competitive terms of the internal market. To ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market, it is necessary that the Member States collect the right amount of VAT, no more no 
less.  
 
 
 
 
167 See Chapter 3.3.1.  
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Polska [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:40.  
170 C-588/10 Kraft Foods Polska [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:40, para 28.  
171 C-566/16 Vámos [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:321, para 41. 
172 See Chapter 5.3.2.  
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6 Final Remarks 
6.1 Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the objective of fiscal harmonisation, more 
specifically the objective of avoiding distortions of competition, pursued by the VAT 
Directive, is observed by the CJEU when interpreting the right of Member States to combat 
VAT fraud under Article 273 VAT Directive, having regard to the principles of neutrality and 
proportionality.  
The problems caused by the optional nature of Article 273 VAT Directive have been partially 
resolved by the CJEU. They have developed an obligation for Member States to take all 
legislative and administrative measures to ensure the collection of all VAT due on their 
territory and for preventing fraud. Furthermore, the mandatory provisions intended to protect 
the financial interest of the Union, such as Article 325 TFEU, have been interpreted as 
applicable in the field of VAT. In fact, however, no Member State has been accused of failing 
to prevent VAT fraud, neither by another Member State or the European Commission. The 
obligations imposed by the VAT Directive and Article 325 TFEU to prevent VAT fraud have 
no action-directing function. They have a justifying function. The obligations are relied on by 
Member States and the CJEU to justify measures already introduced. The risk of Member 
States not preventing VAT – and thus collecting less VAT than necessary – is still 
considerable.  
The CJEU has held that tax evasion is a concept of Union law, the definition of which is not 
left to the Member States. The risk of tax evasion being interpreted differently or extensively 
has thus been resolved by the CJEU. Moreover, from an EU perspective, the rationale behind 
preventing VAT fraud is to achieve the objective of fiscal harmonisation. This is line with 
ensuring the competitive terms of the internal market.  
The CJEU has interpreted Article 273 VAT Directive as allowing Member States a margin of 
discretion regarding the means of achieving the correct collection of VAT and preventing 
fraud. Thus, when preventing VAT fraud, different Member States may introduce different 
measures. Difference in the costs of compliance distorts competition at EU level. Admittedly, 
in exercising this margin of discretion, Member States must comply with, inter alia, the 
principles of neutrality and proportionality. Thus, in spite of the wording of Article 273, 
Member States are not entitled to impose every measure they deem necessary. However, 
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Article 273 VAT Directive, having regard to the principles of neutrality and proportionality, 
does not prevent Member States from imposing different anti-fraud measures in itself, as 
illustrated by the 2006 FTI case.  
When it comes to preventing VAT fraud, the principle of neutrality operates in two different 
situations in the context of Article 273 VAT Directive. The distinguishing factor is the 
uncertainty about the existence of VAT fraud. If the measure introduced refers to a situation 
where it is established that the taxable person has committed VAT fraud, in determining 
whether the measure is precluded by the neutrality of VAT, the concept of legal neutrality is 
decisive. This means that the principle of neutrality does not prevent Member States from 
treating taxpayers who have committed VAT fraud differently from taxpayers who comply 
with their tax obligations. Therefore, it is possible for Member States to treat tax evaders 
differently to mitigate the effects of VAT fraud by collecting the right amount of VAT, such 
as in the 2016 Mary Marinova case. This also allows taxpayers who have a history of not 
fulfilling their tax obligations to be treated differently for VAT purposes to prevent VAT 
fraud. If the Member State is unable to prove the existence of VAT fraud in an individual 
case, i.e. if there is uncertainty about the existence of VAT fraud, taxable persons competing 
with each other may not be treated differently for VAT purposes according to the concept of 
legal neutrality. This is in line with the competitive terms of the internal market.  
If the measure introduced concerns a situation where there is uncertainty about the existence 
of VAT fraud, in determining whether the measure is precluded by the neutrality of VAT, a 
balance is also made between the concept of system neutrality and the interest of preventing 
VAT fraud. The legality of such a measure is determined by the principle of proportionality. 
In doing this, the CJEU seeks to prevent Member States from collecting more VAT than 
necessary in the name of preventing VAT fraud or avoidance. This is in line with the 
competitive terms of the internal market. To ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market, it is necessary that the Member States collect the right amount of VAT, no more no 
less.  
The requirement of equal treatment, read in the light of the principle of neutrality, has been 
interpreted as not precluding Member States from imposing anti-fraud measures on domestic 
transactions that are stricter than those applicable to intra-Union trade. Thus, the risk of 
Member States distorting competition to the detriment of domestic traders remains, contrary 
to the objective of fiscal harmonisation. These measures, on the other hand, must still respect 
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the concept of system neutrality and be proportionate, which helps to ensure the notion of 
VAT as a consumption tax and precludes Member States from collecting more VAT than 
necessary. 
In conclusion, in some aspects the Court has interpreted Article 273 in accordance with the 
objective of fiscal harmonisation, while in other aspects the interpretation has been contrary to 
this objective. All things considered, the interpretation of Article 273 allows Member States 
to distort competition at national and Union level, either by introducing anti-fraud measures 
having this effect or by not doing enough to prevent VAT fraud. In a worst-case scenario, 
when making decisions on tax issues, such as choosing the place of establishment for VAT 
purposes, the decisions are not made on their economic merits by taxable persons but on tax 
evasion laws. This contradicts the notion of an internal market. 
6.2 Further Research  
Article 5(3) TEU, which expresses the principle of subsidiary, states that  
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level. 
Since shared competence applies in the field of VAT, the principle of subsidiarity must be 
observed.173 In the continuum between the obligations to, on the one hand, ensure the 
functioning of the internal market and, on the other hand, observe the principle of 
subsidiarity, where may the VAT provisions on tax fraud be situated? To not violate the 
principle of subsidiarity, the Member States must, first, be unable to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market by themselves. As shown, in terms of ensuring the 
competitive terms of the internal market, the interpretation of Article 273 VAT Directive 
leaves a lot to be desired. Moreover, the purpose of ensuring the proper functioning of the 
internal market must, second, be better achieved at Union level. This would be an interesting 
subject for further research. 
 
173 TFEU, art 4. 
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